The Post-American World

“For the first time ever, we are witnessing genuinely global growth. This is creating an international system in which countries in all parts of the world are no longer objects or observers but players in their own right. It is the birth of a truly global order.”

The definitive statement of the book’s thesis, Zakaria clarifies here that a “post-American world” is not one in which the US does not matter; rather, there are too many important global players for any one state to define the system in its own image. So much of the modern age was characterized by Western powers imposing some level of domination upon the rest, and while that is not entirely an absent feature, a balance is finally beginning to reassert itself.

“A related aspect of this new era is the diffusion of power from states to other actors. The ‘rest’ that is rising includes many nonstate actors. Groups and individuals have been empowered, and hierarchy, centralization, and control are being undermined. Functions that were once controlled by governments are now shared with international bodies like the World Trade Organization and the European Union. Nongovernmental groups are mushrooming every day on every issue in every country […] In such an atmosphere, the traditional applications of national power, both economic and military, have become less effective.”

In addition to power shifting from the West to the non-West, Zakaria also finds that The Diffusion of Global Power involves power shifting away from the traditional nation-state. This puts developing nation-states in a challenging position, as they may be rising in relative terms but are losing control over some of the tools that might allow them to manage their trajectory. For the developed nations, the problem is double in that they are losing two sources of power at once, in both cases to sets of actors that they have tended to regard as lesser in power and importance to themselves.

“Here is the bottom line. In the nine years since 9/11, Al Qaeda Central—the group led by Osama bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri—has been unable to launch a major attack anywhere. It was a terrorist organization; it has become a communications company, producing the occasional videotape rather than actual terrorism. Jihad continues, but the jihadists have had to scatter, make do with smaller targets, and operate on the local level—usually through groups with almost no connection to Al Qaeda Central.”

Writing when memories of 9/11 were fresher and fear of terrorism was still a major part of public discourse, Zakaria argues that mass media’s ability to generate fear about the topic vastly exceeds its actual dangers. The book was published shortly before the death of bin Laden, which only accelerated the decline of the central organization. Zawahiri was killed in 2021, and now Al Qaeda is slowly turning into a historical memory. Minimizing the prevalence of terrorist threats allows for Zakaria’s more positive perception of non-Western cultures gaining economic power and threatening America’s hegemony.

“Since the 1980s these three forces—politics, economics, and technology—have pushed in the same direction to produce a more open, connected, exacting international environment. But they have also given countries everywhere fresh opportunities to start moving up the ladder of growth and prosperity.”

Zakaria acknowledges that the move toward a more globalized economy involves many dislocations and may entail numerous political and economic complications. Still, he is adamant that it remains the best path to secure national prosperity. Those who undertake it will ultimately benefit in the end, so long as they have the courage and wisdom to persist despite the challenges.

“The United States still occupies the top spot in the emerging system. It remains, in the words of the German writer Josef Joffe, ‘the default superpower,’ But, as such, it is also the country that is most challenged by the new order. Most other great powers will see their role in the world expand. That process is already underway.”

Perceptions of American decline are real, but they are also exaggerated because the US has occupied such a lofty position, a position that no other modern nation-state has ever enjoyed. As such, any sense of loss feels particularly acute. The US will continue to exercise enormous power—it retains a large, industrious population; a popular currency; and a massive edge in military power—but it must adjust to a world in which it cannot so easily lay down the law.

“Scientific advances were not merely about creating new machines. They reshaped the mental outlook of Western societies. Take the mechanical clock, which was invented in Europe in the thirteenth century. The historian Daniel Boorstein calls it ‘the mother of machines.’ […] The clock freed man from dependence on the sun and moon. It made it possible to order the day, define the night, organize work, and—perhaps most important—measure the cost of labor, by tracking the number of hours that went into a project.”

In explaining the tremendous rise of the West, leading to the point where it dominated the rest of the world, Zakaria is impatient with theories that ascribe it to material determinism, most famously expressed in books like Jared Diamond’s Guns, Germs, and Steel (1997). While not wanting to feed into chauvinist theories of Western superiority, Zakaria is willing to consider the role of ideas and modes of thought in allowing one society to develop further than others, which in turn forced those other societies to adopt the thinking of their rivals to catch up. The example of the clock is apt, as it not only points to advanced rates of development but also gives way to the contemporary structure of industry and subsequently accumulated wealth.

“The direction of European expansion was determined by the balance of power. For several centuries, despite their mastery of the oceans, European nations did not have any military advantage over Turks and Arabs. So they traded with—but did not try to dominate—the lands of the Middle East and North Africa until the early nineteenth century.”

Another factor that helped Europe achieve such a dominant position was its physical and political geography. Divided by lakes, rivers, and mountains, it was extremely difficult for any one military force to become dominant—the Ottomans would try and fail several times. With Europe divided among many states, their competition with one another drove them outward to seek advantages until, on the brink of World War I, nearly the entire world was under the control of one or another Western power.

“What is vanishing in developing countries is an old high culture and traditional order. It is being eroded by the rise of a mass public, empowered by capitalism and democracy. This is often associated with Westernization because what replaces the old—the new dominant culture—looks Western, and specifically American. […] But the story here is about catering to a much larger public than the small elite who used to define a country’s mores.”

The displacement of traditional orders in favor of a more homogenous culture—with many of its practices rooted in the West—is often a source of fierce criticism. Overall, Zakaria finds this to be a salutary development, one that privileges the wishes of ordinary people who have gained power as consumers and pushes aside elites whose unique cultural traditions may not have had much salience for the people they claimed to represent.

“China’s awakening is reshaping the economic and political landscape, but it is also shaped by the world into which it is rising. Beijing is negotiating the same two forces that are defining the post-American world more broadly—globalization and nationalism. On the one hand, economic and technological pressures are pushing Beijing toward a cooperative integration into the world. But these same forces produce disruption and social upheaval in the country, and the regime seeks new ways to unify an increasingly diverse society.”

China’s rise has become a major source of concern in recent years, with some predicting a new Cold War between a communist superpower and the West. Zakaria offers a reminder that Western institutions, particularly economic ones, have irrevocably shaped the conditions under which China has become a major power; it cannot dispense with those conditions without undermining the very factors that allowed it to rise in the first place.

“The pattern is strong—a market-based economy that achieves middle-income status tends, over the long run, toward liberal democracy. It may be, as many scholars have noted, the single most important and well-documented generalization in political science.”

This may be the most optimistic assessment in a book full of positive outlooks toward the future. In discussing how China has maintained an authoritarian power structure despite its capitalist economics up until this point, Zakaria affirms that free markets must ultimately culminate in free peoples. If China refuses to liberalize, then it must pay the cost financially, and it will fall behind other societies that were willing to embrace democracy and favor the interests of the many over the few.

“Historically, countries influenced by Christianity and Islam have developed an impulse to spread their views and convert people to their faith […] China, in contrast, may never acquire a similar sense of destiny. Simply being China, and becoming a world power, in a sense fulfills its historical purpose. It doesn’t need to spread anything to anyone to vindicate itself.”

Zakaria tries to find a balance between the influence of cultural and economic forces, but here, he tips the scales decisively toward culture, especially religion. In his view, monotheistic and universalist religions like Christianity and Islam divide the world between the faithful and the heretics, often impelling conquest or other forms of cultural imperialism. China’s memory of itself as the longest-lasting and oftentimes most accomplished civilization on Earth makes it more of a model for others to try and imitate.

“But what if China adheres to its asymmetrical strategy? What if it gradually expands its economic ties, acts calmly and moderately, and slowly enlarges its sphere of influence, seeking greater weight, friendship, and influence in the world? What if it slowly pushes Washington onto the sidelines in Asia, in an effort to wear out America’s patience and endurance?”

These may be, at least in the view of some, among the most prophetic lines in the book, but one can argue that they describe how the US-China relationship has progressed in the years since the book’s publication. This does not mean that China is a wicked or conspiratorial actor, only that it is not destined to following the path that Zakaria has set out of cooperative engagement in the international order established by the West.

“India’s growth is taking place not because of the government but despite it. It is not top-down but bottom-up—messy, chaotic, and largely unplanned. The country’s key advantages are a genuine private sector, established rights of property and contract, independent courts, and the rule of law (even if it is often abused).”

Zakaria upholds his native India as a sterling example of what can happen when the workings of civil society are prioritized over the workings of government. India’s political system seems to him ill-equipped to make it a great power, but in a world where the nation-state is diminishing in importance, India does not have to be, in the traditionally understood definition, a great power. It can be an economic powerhouse, and a more developed state would perhaps only get in the way of that development.

“Democracy is India’s destiny. A country so diverse and complex cannot really be governed in any other way. The task for a smart Indian politician is to use democracy to the country’s advantage.”

Zakaria profoundly hopes that his native India will accept its incredible diversity and become a true model of mass democracy. He deplores the efforts of the Hindu nationalist BJP in their efforts to demonize Muslims, as India has the world’s largest Muslim population, and insists on one correct path to being Indian. Unfortunately, the BJP has been dominant for at least a decade of Indian politics. Democracies remain entirely capable of securing the interests of the majority at the expense of others.

“Indian foreign policy in its early decades had an airy quality, full of rhetoric about peace and goodwill. Many Western observers believed these pieties to be a smoke screen behind which the nation was cannily pursuing its interests. But sometimes what you see is what you get.”

During the Cold War, India professed neutrality, insisting that its goals were economic development rather than alignment with either the US or the Soviet Union. Zakaria’s low opinion of this approach seems tied to his conviction that Western-style capitalism proved so vastly superior to Soviet socialism that to pretend neutrality on such a matter is to give up on obvious benefits with no apparent gains.

“A world in which India is a great power and moves confidently across the global stage, setting rules and not merely being shaped by them, and in which it is a partner of the most powerful country in history—that is altogether new and unsettling proposition. ‘Why is the United States being nice to us now?’ several such commentators have asked me. In 2007, they were still searching for the hidden hand.”

As with China, Zakaria regards India to have some political peculiarities that have played an outsized role in restraining the country from reaching its potential. Where China prefers hiding its power rather than flaunting it, India’s postcolonial history encourages it to look at great powers like the United States through the lens of suspicion, even when there is no evidence to support it. Their insistence on treating the Americans as conspirators rather than partners is, in his opinion, limiting its potential ascent to the heights of global power.

“We speak today of the American dream, but before it there was an ‘English way of life’—one that was watched, admired, and copied throughout the world. For example, the ideas of fair play, athleticism, and amateurism propounded by the famous English educator Dr. Thomas Arnold […] heavily influenced the Frenchman Baron de Coubertin—who, in 1896, launched the modern Olympic games. The writer Ian Buruma has aptly described the Olympics as ‘an English bucolic fantasy.’”

Zakaria begins his chapters on the United States with an extensive comparison to the British Empire. Among many obvious comparisons, including a far-flung military establishment and the use of the English language, is an ideal notion of a world that at least ought to be united in peace under the rule of law. There is perhaps no better modern expression of that than the Olympic games, which—despite its Greek associations—is European (and, in Zakaria’s telling, English) in its origin. Being a “bucolic fantasy” means that the concept refers to idealized notions to which the English people originally aspired, something at odds with their actions then as a global superpower. Now, the United States has hosted the Olympic games more than any other nation.

“American military power is not the cause of its strength but the consequence. The fuel is America’s economic and technological base, which remains extremely strong, even in the sake of the worst recession since the 1930s. The United States does face larger, deeper, and broader challenges than it has ever faced in its history, and the rise of the rest does mean that it will lose some share of global GDP […] but America will remain a vital, vibrant economy, at the forefront of the next revolutions in science, technology, and industry—as long as it can embrace and adjust to the challenges confronting it.”

This is the strongest qualification of the book’s title: A post-American world is not post-American so much as post-hegemonic. The US will continue to matter and can still exercise preeminent influence because the fundamental rules of success in world politics have not changed. The US can draw on its traditional strengths of innovation and openness, so long as it can be patient with having to share more power with a greater variety of international actors.

“America remains by far the most attractive destination for students, taking 30 percent of the total number of foreign students globally. All these advantages will not be erased easily […] here’s a statistic about engineers that you might not have heard. In India, universities graduate between 35 and 50 PhDs in computer science each year; in America, the figure is 1,000.”

America’s education system is a frequent point of lament in worries about national decline, and higher education has become a major source of political controversy. Zakaria is confident that, while other countries are gaining in relative terms, the US education system remains the envy of the world in terms of both quantity and quality. As in other areas, the US is overestimating the danger simply because others are beginning to capture a fraction of the advantages that the US once held all to itself.

“The United States continues functioning as it always has—perhaps subconsciously assuming that it is still leagues ahead of the pack. American legislators rarely think about the rest of the world when writing laws, regulations, and policies. American officials rarely refer to global standards […] but now everyone is playing America’s game, and playing to win.”

Although the US has made some major mistakes in the post-Cold War era, most notably the Iraq War and the financial crisis, Zakaria generally regards it as doing the right things, especially in the realm of economics. The only problem is that simply doing what has worked before is no longer sufficient when other countries are starting to catch up, shrinking the margin of error and forcing more awareness of how things are occurring offshore. The US does not need to completely overhaul its approach, but it can no longer pretend that it operates essentially alone.

“[Roosevelt and Truman] built an international order of alliances and multilateral institutions and helped get the world back on its feet by pumping out vast amounts of aid and private investment. The centerpiece of this effort, the Marshall Plan, was worth $100 billion in today’s dollars. For most of the twentieth century, in other words, America embraced international cooperation not out of fear and vulnerability, but out of confidence and strength.”

Zakaria has a rosy view of American history, one where the US rose to the heights of power without having to impose its will. The Marshall Plan was a remarkable act of political generosity that invested in the regeneration of Western European industry after World War II, and it was essential for developing alliances and creating a foreign market for American goods. Politicians still call for modern-day Marshall Plans to deal with everything from climate change to artificial intelligence, hearkening back to a seeming golden age when the US was truly a force for good in the world.

“There is still a strong market for American power, for both geopolitical and economic reasons. But even more centrally, there remains a strong ideological demand for it. ‘No one in Asia wants to live in a Chinese-dominated world. There is no Chinese dream to which people aspire’ […] What the world really wants from America is not that it offer a concession on trade here and there but that it affirm its own ideals.”

In the closing chapter, Zakaria affirms that America’s so-called “soft power”—the appeal of its ideas and culture—holds the key to its success in a post-hegemonic environment. It may be an exaggeration to say that “no one in Asia” wants a Chinese-dominated world, but the US has found success in building both economic and military partnerships with China’s allies (as well as Russia’s). This is a favorable sign that despite the Iraq War, other nations will still welcome the responsible exercise of US power.

“‘It is better to be feared than loved,’ Machiavelli wrote. It is a motto that Dick Cheney took to heart. In a 2007 speech, he quoted Bernard Lewis to the effect that, during the Cold War, Middle Eastern dictators learned that they should fear the Soviet Union but not America. Machiavelli and Cheney are wrong. Yes, the Soviet Union was feared by its allies, while the United States was loved, or at least liked. Look who’s still around.”

Zakaria takes the great Machiavelli somewhat out of context—the Florentine did say that if one could be both, that was the best condition of all. However, his basic point holds that in the new international environment, persuasion wins over coercion because power is just too diffuse and asymmetric for anyone, even the most powerful state on Earth, to impose its will. The end of the Cold War should speak to the appeal of American ideals rather than the might of its economy or military.