The Post-American World

On June 22, 1897, the British Empire, at the peak of its power, celebrated the diamond jubilee of Queen Victoria’s reign in a massive display of grandeur. It seemed at that moment that Britain was impervious to history. The British Empire was a remarkable institution, having “created the first truly global market” and making its culture—namely the English language—ubiquitous (186). By 1897, Britain could merit favorable comparisons to the Romans, but it would soon find itself on the path of decline. In 1899, it fought a costly war against the Boers in South Africa. By the turn of the 20th century, its economic output was less than Germany’s and significantly less than that of the United States.

Its rate of economic growth had slowed to a crawl, and whatever the limits of its culture or political system, it would have been very difficult for such a small country to catch up with the rise of continent-states like the US and Russia. Zakaria clarifies that “[t]he fundamental point is that Britain was undone as a great power not because of bad politics but because of bad economics. It had great global influence, but its economy was structurally weak” (197). Britain had wisely decided to accept the rise of the US as a peer competitor rather than challenge it, but its interests in other parts of the world were so far-flung that it could never fund any of them sufficiently. Finally, World War II was both a political and economic death blow to its imperial grandeur. 

The British example is meant to serve as a parallel to the United States, although the US is obviously different in its much larger population and vastly more sophisticated military establishment. Zakaria predicts that, unlike Britain, “America will remain a vital, vibrant economy, at the forefront of the next revolutions in science, technology, and industry—as long as it can embrace and adjust to the challenges confronting it” (199). The US has already retained its preeminent position in the face of enormous changes, holding the edge in new fields like nanotechnology, and its offshoring of manufacturing has allowed it to maximize profits at the ends of product design and marketing while saving on the fixed costs of actual production.

The US might not produce as many skilled workers as other countries, but the ones they do produce have better skills on average, thanks in part to a system of higher education that remains the envy of the world. Even its much-maligned public education still produces strong results but struggles to provide equal access across racial and class lines, therefore distorting its aggregate outcomes. Europeans show similar aptitude in this respect, but the US is much stronger demographically, especially on account of its willingness to take in immigrants. Zakaria describes how immigrants have often left behind their homes to work in the US, even though “Americans have always worried about such immigrants—whether from Ireland or Italy, China or Mexico. But these immigrants have gone on to become the backbone of the American working class” (216).

There are concerns that Americans are not saving enough, as well as concerns about a potential explosion of deficit spending and consequent debt to further the country’s consumerist habits. Now that so many other countries have adopted at least certain aspects of the American financial model to become more competitive, the US will face diminishing returns if it continues to act as though it is a hegemonic power that does not have to learn and adapt to others. Zakaria asserts that “[l]earning from the rest is no longer a matter of morality or politics. Increasingly it’s about competitiveness” (225). In the aftermath of the Great Recession, big corporations have found ways to profit from technological development and globalization, but often at the expense of ordinary workers, who cannot compete with foreign workers who operate at a fraction of the labor costs.

To stay competitive, the US must once again “be the world’s most important, continuing source of new ideas, big and small, technical and creative, economic and political” (232). This requires a series of political reforms to minimize the role of special interests and encourage bipartisan cooperation. This will be challenging, especially in an increasingly competitive international market, but Zakaria is convinced that the people “are capable of responding to the economic pressure and competition they face. They can adjust, adapt, and persevere” (237). Whether Washington can do so is another story.