The Post-American World

China’s reemergence as a great power in the last half century “is reshaping the economic and political landscape, but it is also being shaped by the world into which it is rising” (101). In the late 1970s, communist leader Deng Xiaoping tossed aside party doctrine and embraced modernization, with astonishing results. Over 30 years, the size of its economy doubled every eight years. It represents a huge percentage of global manufacturing, practically monopolizing the production of certain goods. It holds trillions in foreign currency reserves, and though it is a long way from surpassing the United States, it sits at a very comfortable second in most major measures of power. China is communist in name only, having clearly accepted free-market principles, although the state does play a much greater role in the management of its otherwise capitalist economy. Furthermore, since the party does not answer to voters, they are at least capable of making necessary if unpopular decisions. However, there has also been a growth in inequality that has triggered a surprisingly large amount of public protest for an authoritarian state.

For China, “unprecedented economic growth has produced unprecedented social change” (110), which often proceeds faster than the country’s ability to manage it. Most states that have modernized and found great economic success have also faced pressures to democratize, although the state has instead invested in sophisticated methods of surveillance and social control so far. Zakaria predicts that the most likely outcome is for China to become a “mixed” regime with both democratic and authoritarian aspects. He finds “that the pattern is strong—a market-based economy that achieves middle-income status tends, over the long run, toward liberal democracy. It may be, as many scholars have noted, the single most important and well-documented generalization in political science” (115). The nation may fear some of the consequences of modernization, but they are unlikely to give up all the benefits and go back to Maoist extremism, isolation, and poverty.

Chinese diplomats have been evasive about describing the country as a rising power, seemingly reluctant to come across as assertive or potentially destabilizing. In a state-produced documentary about the rise and fall of the great powers, the final episode advises that “the path to power is through markets, not empires” (121). Without overstating the role of culture in shaping such attitudes, Zakaria does see the influence of Confucianism, with its emphasis on social harmony and moral duties rather than absolute doctrines handed down by a paternalistic deity. He asserts that “[s]imply being China, and becoming a world power, in a sense fulfills its historical purpose” (125). 

Despite this cultural legacy, countries that gain a lot of power in the modern era tend to try to exert it, often to destabilizing effect. Even if the nation has benign intentions, its actions may still provoke fear and opposition, tempting China into using its vast power. China’s foreign policy has been overwhelmingly concerned with building commercial ties, but these have clear political ramifications. For example, it has a major trade relationship with Vietnam and hopes to use that to cool traditionally hostile attitudes, but China can sometimes be clumsy at trying to manipulate public opinion. The main question of China’s foreign policy concerns Taiwan, which the country regards as a renegade province, although going to war to reclaim it would likely have terrible effects on China’s economy.

Regarding the United States, there is ample historical evidence to suggest that a dominant power and a rising challenger must clash, but there is also profound interdependence between the two powers, even as they have clashing interests in several areas. China flouted billions to sustain deficit spending in the US while remaining critically reliant on the US market to buy up its exports. This mutual reliance creates many avenues of danger, but it helps preserve a degree of cooperation, while “a serious US-Chinese rivalry would define the new age and turn it away from integration, trade, and globalization” (141). For the time being, the US military edge over China is considerable, and China has not gone looking for many fights. Nonetheless, it may continue to build its power slowly, until it is powerful enough to embark on a more confrontational course with a greater chance of success.