The End of the World Is Just the Beginning: Mapping the Collapse of Globalization

Early humans wandered, seeking various plants and animals. Certain places (such as Ethiopia, with its savannah and rain forest) thus had the first geographies of success. As humans discovered the benefits of excrement as a fertilizer, sedentary agriculture took hold. Success depended on a climate that enabled year-round harvesting of crops, consistent water supplies, and natural boundaries to prevent theft. The only places that met all three criteria were “rivers that flow[ed] through low-latitude and low-altitude deserts” (11). Rivers additionally aided in transport and provided power via waterwheels. The latter replaced the “really brutal work” (13) of grinding harvests into flour. This labor savings led to the development of towns where people invented tools to manage food surpluses and made other advances. Places such as the Lower Tigris, Euphrates, and Nile boasted geographies of success in this era.

In the seventh century, the development of windmills greatly expanded possible locations for sedentary agriculture. Only rainfall and wind were needed. This change made life less secure, however, because enemies could starve populations by destroying windmills. It favored areas that had a big internal frontier with easy means of distribution, specifically England, Japan, Sweden, and the Ottoman Empire. Most other communities were short-lived, but their sheer magnitude caused an explosion in skilled labor and jump-started technical advances. With improvements in sails, deepwater navigation greatly expanded trade. Places not subject to land invasion, such as Spain, Portugal, and later England, had geographies of success. The dominant political unit became a globe-spanning, trade-based deepwater empire.

The harnessing of fossil fuels, like coal, led to the Industrial Revolution. As ships and later machines generated power, human labor was less necessary. Electricity extended the day, giving people the opportunity to read at night. The biggest restriction was capital: Much was needed to rebuild societies. Together, industrialization and deepwater navigation led to the development of destructive military powers and to devastating wars.

The US has “the perfect Geography of Success” (25). When the country expanded to the Midwest, it benefited from “200,000 square miles of the world’s most fertile farmland” (27). In addition, its many navigable waterways allowed for easy movement of people and goods. The borders are relatively secure, with oceans to the east and west. The northern and southern borders are extremely secure as well. Along the East Coast, barrier islands and peninsulas protect ports. With food production in the Midwest, the Northeast shifted to value-added labor.

In Europe, swift industrialization resulted in social upheaval and revolutions. For example, England made enemies by dumping products on the market and entangled itself in wars. Additionally, Russia underwent a revolution, and the aristocrats were killed. In contrast, the US transitioned to industrialization slowly. Its large size kept land costs low, rivers kept transportation costs low, and immigration kept labor costs low. The process was therefore peaceful.

After World War II, the US emerged as the dominant world power. Instead of creating an empire, it offered potential allies a deal. In exchange for support in the Cold War against Russia, the US would provide its allies with security, protect commerce, and open its lucrative market to allied exports. Solidifying this agreement at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, the US created a “globalized Order” (39) and changed the rules of the game, bringing previously warring countries into alliance. The system worked well until the US and its allies won the Cold War. On November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall came down, and in the 1990s, the Soviet Union broke apart. Without a common enemy, the Bretton Woods agreement lost its rationale. Throughout the 1990s, the US remained committed to a “security paradigm that suspends geopolitical competition and subsidizes the global Order” (41). However, that commitment became fragile.

Where people live matters greatly. In the post-World War II era, urbanization shifted masses from farms to cities, beginning with textile manufacturing during the Industrial Revolution. As new techniques were developed, urban areas needed large numbers of workers. The countryside began to empty. The development of fertilizers and labor-saving devices in agriculture pushed even more people into cities. Governments then began providing mass services, such as electricity and health care, to those in urban areas. Food production became more reliable, and sewage systems reduced disease. As a result, the average life span doubled. Birth rates, however, declined, as children were less of an asset in the city than on farms. This transformation from farms to towns took more than 200 years, or seven generations—but only for Great Britain.

The transformation from farms to towns and the impact on demographics occurred increasingly faster elsewhere. The next to industrialize, Germany, completed the process in four generations and became an economic and military powerhouse in the 1930s. The new globalization era, enshrined via Bretton Woods in the aftermath of World War II, expedited urbanization on a global scale and resulted in declining birth rates. The women’s rights movement and the development of birth control contributed to the latter trend. A globalized agricultural sector, with food easily imported, further enabled urbanization. The first wave of industrialization occurred in Western Europe, the former Axis powers, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Since 1965, population gains in these countries are nearly all a result of longer life spans. The transition in Canada, South Korea, Italy, and Argentina took only 2.5 generations. Spain, Portugal, and Greece made the transformation in two generations.

Just as electricity exacerbated these trends, so did the digital revolution. In the period between 1980 and 2015, “all the world’s internationally wired systems fell into one of two broad buckets” (54): They occurred either early in the demographic transition, with mortality falling but the drop in birth rates not catastrophic, or further along in the process and therefore lacking enough young people to consume what they produced. The short-term solution was to export goods. Because global trade is no longer in US interests, that solution is unsustainable. Additionally, once a country has more older than young people, it experiences a population crash from which it will not recover. China has experienced these trends in a single generation. The text predicts that for the first tier of countries, such as Japan, Germany, and South Korea, “all breaks apart” (60) in the 2020s. For others, problems would come in the 2030s, 2040s, and 2050s. While countries with low-income economies tend to have a younger demographic, the collapse of global trade would nonetheless be devastating given the specialization of labor.

The US-led “Order (big O) […] institutionalized order (little o), which in turn allowed industrialization and urbanization to spread everywhere” (65). The result was a “sustained consumption and investment boom” (65). This system bred a complex specialization of labor. As this system inevitably unravels, countries will have to attend to their own needs and will become less efficient and productive. The text argues that de-globalization will produce “decivilization,” or a “cascade of reinforcing breakdowns” (66) that will destroy the functioning of the world. Citing the examples of Venezuela and Zimbabwe, which chose this path, the author paints a grim picture for most countries. Large and resource-rich countries, such as the US, will fare better. The US, France, Argentina, Sweden, and New Zealand have avoided a collapse in birth rates. However, the text concludes that these exceptions are not nearly enough to support a new global system.

Ever since Columbus’s expedition in the 15th century, the global economic pie grew. As worldwide reach became easier, society generated more products, economic actors, and larger markets. It was a “world of more” (70). The major economic models of capitalism, socialism, command-communism, and fascist corporatism all rely on a growing economy. Capitalism promotes a small role for government in which most economic decisions are made privately, but without growth, capitalism produces “massive inequality” (74) and potentially social unrest. While socialist governments adopt a more active role, all citizens are worse off without expansion. In command-driven communism, the government is the “sole decider” (71) of economic matters, and without growth, it requires extreme repression and prescient decision-making by leaders. Although fascist corporatism joins business and state leadership, it still leads to massive inequality and revolt without growth.

The text suggests that only two preexisting economic models could work in a de-globalized world: imperialism and mercantilism. Both are antagonistic toward other countries and require a powerful military, an attitude of cultural superiority, and many disposable young people. No country has all three of these requirements. Emphasizing that everything is about to change, the text cautions that the process will be traumatic and that new systems will take decades to invent and implement.

Contemplating models for a de-globalized world, the text cites Russia and Japan as examples. Between 1986 and 1994, Russia’s birth rate was cut in half while its death rate doubled. Despite experiencing de-industrialization and a simultaneous collapse in population, however, Russia has “reasonably reliable food, fuel, and electricity” (81). The country has nuclear weapons to deter attacks and vast resources of energy. Japan reached a population crisis in the 1990s and opted for de-sourcing. It relocated its productive capacity to other countries that had workers and markets. Some of the income returned to Japan and supported the aging population. For several reasons, however, the text argues that this approach is not replicable. For example, Japan had three decades to transition with global trade still in place and began the process with much wealth. In addition, the coronavirus has robbed the world of time to deal with an upcoming crisis: “Most countries will never return to the degree of stability or growth they experienced in 2019” (88).

Very few countries, most significantly the US, have “kept the demographic torch burning” (89). Geographically, the US is advantaged because it has high-quality farmland to ensure food security, abundant land for habitation, waterways that reduce transportation costs, access to shale and solar power, and relatively few security threats. Its pacts with Mexico and Canada expand its economic power as well. Compared to other countries, the US had more children, the “Baby Boomer” generation being the most productive in this respect. While subsequent generations have decreased in size, they are larger than their counterparts abroad, even into the Millennial generation. Given its history, the US assimilates immigrants well and will continue to attract highly skilled labor. The wave of Mexican immigration, which is now over, has benefited the US by providing labor and youth. Neither Mexico nor the US would have to adjust to a new world order until the 2050s at least. In comparison, China’s demographic collapse has already commenced. The text maintains that given “demographic collapse in much of the world and demographic stability in the United States, America’s share of the total global population is certain to increase” (104). The US will have time to adapt to any new system.

The final version of Zeihan’s manuscript was due on February 16, 2022. During the following week, Russia invaded Ukraine. The author notes that such disruptions are “a feature of the world we are already devolving into” (105).