The Afghanistan Papers: A Secret History of the War

When Barack Obama became president in January 2009, he kept on Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense and had Gates promptly dispense with David McKiernan, who had been the US NATO commander since the previous October. Obama was planning a large increase of troops, and while the administration publicly stated that it was just time for a change, speculation swirled that McKiernan was gone because he had been forthright in his criticisms of the war. Obama promised a strategic reorientation, but especially by keeping Gates, he basically accepted the existing plan of providing security long enough to establish an Afghan army and police. The same problems persisted regarding defining victory, classifying friend from foe, and alienating the public they were supposed to be protecting. For a new commander, Obama brought in Stanley McChrystal, who had made a name for himself leading Special Operations Command in Iraq, dealing a major blow to its Al Qaeda affiliate there. McChrystal saw his success in Iraq as a part of a broad counterinsurgency strategy, which would require a huge influx of troops and resources. However, McChrystal’s plan took little account of the massive differences between Iraq and Afghanistan—the former was unambiguously a combat zone, whereas the latter was more of a peacekeeping mission for many NATO contingents.