Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege, 1942–1943

The German offensive (codenamed Operation Barbarossa) was the largest invasion in history. Four million soldiers were made ready along the border with the Soviet Union with the aim of establishing a defensive line that ran along the Soviet border. Soviet industry was to be captured or destroyed by the Luftwaffe (the German air force). Most German soldiers received orders at nightfall on June 21. As the Wehrmacht had seen nothing but success so far, the majority felt this would be a short war.

Nazi propaganda sold the invasion as a Rassenkampf, a race war between Germans and Bolsheviks that must be won so that the German state could survive. The dehumanization of Russians, and especially Russian Jews, proved so successful that the “special orders” (14) many regimental officers received—which ordered collective measures against partisans and the massacre of Jewish people—saw only limited objections. Post-war claims that the Wehrmacht was ignorant of the war crimes being committed by the SS (or Schutzstaffel, the elite security branch of the Nazi Party)  are shown by Beevor to be demonstrably false, but the Wehrmacht is noted to not have been a homogeneous entity. Some held anti-Nazi beliefs and protested massacres.

On June 22 at 3:15 am German artillery began to bombard Russian frontier units. Hours earlier, the land mines near the border had been removed and some German units had infiltrated behind Russian lines to cut communications and sow chaos. At dawn, the infantry advanced and aerial raids were launched against Soviet airfields, destroying 1,200 Soviet planes in the next nine hours. German strategy focused on Panzer divisions encircling the Russian armies to destroy the Soviet fighting capability before advancing on their three main objectives: Leningrad, Moscow, and Ukraine. These were to be attacked by Army Group North, Army Group Centre, and Army Group South, respectively. German generals prioritized Moscow as the key goal, but Hitler emphasized the importance of seizing the agricultural wealth of Ukraine and the oil fields in the Caucuses. Because of this, Army Group South was reinforced with soldiers intended for the center, with the armies of Hungary and Romania attached to it.

Beevor writes that few offensives have ever had the advantages of Operation Barbarossa. Complete surprise had been achieved because of Stalin’s insistence on reconciliation with Hitler. Soviet armies were rapidly encircled and annihilated while German forces made continual progress eastward. The heaviest fighting happened in the south, where the Russian general had prepared defenses, but the Germans still advanced.

Most held the view that the USSR would collapse shortly after the invasion, especially because Stalin had been purging his army officers since 1937. Around 36,671 officers had been executed, imprisoned, or dismissed. In recent conflicts, the Russians had generally performed poorly, and in the early stages of Operation Barbarossa, the Germans felt confirmed in their low opinion of Russian fighting. They saw the Soviet Union’s politics as leading to fundamental flaws in its military; generals were unwilling to take the initiative in case it led to them being persecuted. Beevor supports their analysis, describing a “hysteria of deflected blame” (24) in Russian leadership after the German invasion, but he notes that lessons were being learned. By July 15, the Stavka (staff office) of the Russian general Georgy Zhukov had made a document analyzing the failures in the war and suggesting that their army should be reformed to become a more responsive and rapid organization. Also in the Russian favor was the consistent tenacity of the Russian soldiers in defense. They had been convinced by Soviet propaganda of the need to stand against the Germans or die.

Despite Russian bravery, by mid-July, the Red Army was in a bad position. Two million men, 3,500 tanks, and 6,000 airplanes had been lost. Losses continued to mount as several armies were trapped in Smolensk and the city of Kyiv was encircled. The Germans felt they were fighting machine-like soldiers—mass-produced and mindless.

The momentum of the German advance began to fade in mid-July. The size of Russia, the seemingly never-ending supply of Russian armies, vehicle breakdowns, and the health toll of a continual rapid advance contributed to the offensive stagnating. The logistical struggle of launching three separate invasions across a huge front was simply beyond the operational capability of the Wehrmacht. Frustrations led to quarrels among the German staff—mostly concerning whether Moscow should be the main goal or Ukraine. Hitler, emphasizing the importance of Ukraine, ordered Army Group Centre to halt while Panzer elements were detached and sent to Army Groups North and South. Hitler then changed his mind but it was late September before the army was again ready to advance. By this time, winter was coming close, which would end the German advance. Beevor argues that Hitler’s previous victories and lack of real military experience meant that he ignored the logistical issues faced by his forces—a problem compounded by his refusal to gear the German economy for an all-out war.

The renewed German offensive against Moscow threw Russian lines into confusion and though Stalin initially refused to acknowledge the scale of the threat, soon 100,000 citizens in Moscow were formed into a militia, and 250,000 people—many of whom were women—were tasked with constructing defenses around the city. The weather began to hamper German efforts but they were still able to encircle two more Russian armies, prompting Stalin to hold a crisis meeting on October 17 to discuss whether he should leave Moscow, which he eventually decided against. At this time, he would demand accurate reports from the frontlines but accuse those who told him the truth of panic-mongering.

The Germans were ultimately unable to break through Russian lines and withdrew forward elements of their army to more favorable defensive positions for the winter. Hitler’s insistence that no winter campaigns be launched meant that many Germans lacked adequate clothing against the cold, leading to 100,000 cases of frostbite among soldiers. As the Germans were suffering, the Russian army launched a large counterattack using tanks and planes well-made for cold weather. The offensive made considerable progress, forcing the Germans to retreat. This convinced Stalin that he could break the German army, so on January 5, 1942, he announced his plans for a general offensive across the wide front. Hitler, conversely, was convinced that if his soldiers continued to hold, this would finally break the Russian army, so he refused to allow for a retreat. Russian attacks were occasionally able to encircle German armies, but these were resupplied by air, which convinced Hitler this was a viable strategy for all future Kessels.

In the winter, German soldiers searched for food, clothing, and shelter, which led to Russian civilians being looted and displaced. The Russian army was a little better, destroying houses to deny the Germans shelter. Within this brutal conflict, many German soldiers suffered from extreme homesickness but were forbidden from telling civilians about the war.

The German army was not broken by Russian attacks in the winter of 1941-1942, but Beevor argues by December 1941, the balance of power in the world had swung decisively against the Axis. The Germans had been unable to knock Russia out of the war swiftly and—with America’s entry into the war—the Allies now had a notable industrial advantage. However, the Battle of Stalingrad would be the psychological turning point in World War II (WWII).