Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege, 1942–1943

Adolf Hitler (1889-1945) was the Chancellor and then Führer (leader) of Germany from 1933 until his suicide in 1945. Hitler rose to power by exploiting the economic instability and anger in inter-war Germany following the country’s defeat in the First World War, promoting an ideology based on German expansion, “Aryan” racial supremacy, antisemitism, anti-communism, and military rearmament. Once in power, Hitler implemented increasingly severe discriminatory policies against Germany’s Jewish population and other people labeled “undesirable,” which would accelerate throughout the war into the program of genocide, displacement, and dispossession now known as the Holocaust. Germany became a highly militaristic state, building a huge munitions capability, growing the armed forces, and amassing troops on national borders. From 1938, Hitler annexed Austria and Czechoslovakia and re-armed the demilitarized Rhineland, which existed as a non-military buffer between Germany and France following the First World War. The Second World War was declared by France and Britain in 1939, after Germany invaded Poland.

Hitler was an autocratic ruler with absolute power: Germany’s national actions during his leadership were largely determined by his personal ideology, as laid out in his 1925 treatise Mein Kampf, and by his personal character and whims. In Stalingrad, the role of Hitler is central to the theme of The Dynamics of Warfare and Strategy under a Dictatorship. Beevor shows the outsized importance of Hitler’s unchecked opinion as leading to consistent strategic mistakes. Those viewed by Beevor to be most serious are Hitler’s equivocation on the main goal in Operation Barbarossa, his underestimation of the Russian soldiers, his obsession with conquering Stalingrad at all costs, and his belief in Goering’s claims of being able to resupply the Sixth Army by air. Hitler’s pride and military incompetence meant the Sixth Army was destroyed; this defeat heavily shaped the subsequent course of the war, leading to Hitler’s ultimate defeat.

Stalingrad also highlights Hitler’s racism and his weaponization of racial tension and prejudice. Beevor explores how Hitler presented Germany’s invasion of Russia as an existential war based on the survival of the Aryan race and culture. By dehumanizing Russian people in his government messages and enacting genocidal policies against Russia’s population, Hitler directly increased The Brutality of the Eastern Front, especially the impact of occupation on civilian populations.

Friedrich Paulus (1890-1957) is a key figure in Stalingrad in his role commanding, and surrendering, the German Sixth Army. As an officer in the First World War and a chief planner on the general staff, Paulus had developed a reputation as a fastidious but uninspiring leader by 1941. He had taken part in planning Operation Barbarossa, during which the German general Heinz Guderian described him as clever, hardworking, and talented but worryingly indecisive and inexperienced.

In November 1941, to fill a personnel vacancy, Paulus was given command of the Sixth Army despite having never led a division in combat. In the battles before Case Blue, Paulus became deeply loyal to Hitler, whom he believed to be a military genius. This, and his inexperience, limited his use of initiative throughout the campaign. He successfully led the Sixth Army into Stalingrad and almost managed to conquer the city but failed to make adequate preparations for Operation Uranus. His commitment to holding the Kessel under Hitler’s orders was an important factor in the eventual destruction of the Sixth Army. After his capture, Paulus was resettled in the Soviet Union and became a vocal critic of the Nazi regime. After 1953, he moved to East Germany and became part of the government administration, advocating for German reunification. He died in Dresden in 1957.

Stalingrad depicts Paulus as an unskilled general, who irresponsibly placed too much faith in Hitler. Beevor views this as a fatal flaw in Paulus as a leader, one matched by his lack of battlefield instincts. Both flaws combined to cripple the Sixth Army’s effectiveness. Beevor also notes that Paulus failed to stop the war crimes committed by the Sixth Army, which makes him morally responsible for them, and that he did little to negotiate for the welfare of his own troops, 94% of whom died in Russian captivity.

Georgy Zhukov (1896-1974) was a key member of the Soviet army throughout the Second World War, beginning the war as chief of the general staff and eventually becoming marshal of the Soviet Union. Before Germany’s invasion, he had risen through the ranks of the Red Army and gained recognition for his decisive victory over Japanese forces at the Battle of Khalkhin Gol. Following Operation Barbarossa, he played an important role in the reformation of the Red Army and its successful defense of Moscow before leading the planning of Operation Uranus. After the Stalingrad campaign, he was instrumental in the Russian victory at Kursk in 1943 and the capture of Berlin in 1945, which marked the end of the war in Europe.

Beevor argues that Zhukov was the most talented of the Russian generals, describing him as “not just a good planner, he was the best implementer of plans” (222). His significance is marked by Beevor calling part of the book’s treatment of Operation Uranus “Zhukov’s Trap.” Beevor identifies Zhukov’s Staff Office as making the most concerted effort to identify and rectify weaknesses in Russia’s strategy and execution. Beevor presents Zhukov as the driver of reform in the Red Army. That Stalin allowed Zhukov’s talents to be fully utilized is shown as a key reason for Russian victory, in contrast to the timidity and control of the dynamic between Hitler and Paulus.

Joseph Stalin (1878-1953) was the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1924 until his death in 1952. The longest-serving Soviet leader, Stalin had a huge impact on Russia and global politics in the 20th century.

Born into a poor Georgian family in Tsarist Russia, he gained status during and after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, becoming the leader of the Soviet Union after the death of its founder, Vladimir Lenin. Stalin implemented rapid modernization reforms in the Soviet Union and transformed the Russian economy, but his decisions led to widespread famine and suffering—particularly notable within certain regions, such as Ukraine, which were deprioritized in favor of other regions. Stalin was an autocratic leader and used violence and the threat of violence to maintain control. The resulting purges of the 1930s, which executed those deemed to be non-compliant, heavily decreased the fighting ability of his own army.

Beevor draws significant comparisons between Stalin and Hitler. Both are leaders who demand the massacres of their citizens and interfere in military matters, leading to defeats. While unsparingly critical of both leaders’ immorality, Beevor considers Stalin to have the advantage of a “lack of ideological shame” (221). His willingness to backtrack on decisions and ideologies enabled him to change his mind as expedient, and allowed his generals more autonomy than Germany’s. Beevor considers that Stalin was better able to rely on the advice and experience of his military command than Hitler was.