Nuclear War: A Scenario

“Humans created the nuclear weapon in the twentieth century to save the world from evil, and now, in the twenty-first century, the nuclear weapon is about to destroy the world. To burn it all down.”

Much time has elapsed since the US dropped atomic bombs on Japan. This has led many to believe that nuclear weapons, precisely because of their incredible destructive capacity, are ultimately a force for peace. Whether or not this fact is true in the abstract, Jacobsen highlights that it does not change the material facts surrounding nuclear weapons and the catastrophic destruction they would inflict if used.

“How, and why, do U.S. defense scientists know such hideous things, and with such exacting precision? How does the U.S. government know so many nuclear effects-related facts, while the general public remains blind? The answer is as grotesque as the questions themselves because, for all these years, since the end of World War II, the U.S. government has been preparing for, and rehearsing plans for, a General Nuclear War. A nuclear World War III that is guaranteed to leave, at minimum, 2 billion dead.”

In this passage, Jacobsen raises questions about disparities between the knowledge US defense scientists and government officials have regarding nuclear effects and what the general public knows. This quote highlights that out of the public view, the government has and continues to make extensive preparations for nuclear war, including actions that could, at any moment, sacrifice a massive number of its citizens while prioritizing its own functions.

“With regards to Moscow alone, the plan called for a total of forty megatons-megatons-on Moscow, about four thousand times more than the bomb over Hiroshima and perhaps twenty to thirty times more than all the non-nuclear bombs dropped by the Allies in both theaters during more than four years of World War II.”

The term “overkill” initially referred to the use of nuclear weapons beyond what was necessary to annihilate all human life within a given target area. This passage questions the necessity of the enormous firepower described, suggesting that official justifications for such capabilities may lack substantiative rationale.

“Setsuko Thurlow’s survivor experience, and Dr. Hachiya’s survivor experience, and countless others like theirs were for decades suppressed by the U.S. Army and its occupation forces in Japan. The effects that atomic weapons used in combat had on people and buildings were kept classified and proprietary because U.S. officials wanted that information for themselves. For another nuclear war. The Pentagon wanted to make sure it knew more about nuclear blast effects than any future enemy could possibly know”

As the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki fall into the more distant past, and the survivors begin to dwindle in numbers, the horror of that event may fade in memory. As Jacobsen points out, this is not just a matter of history moving on. Rather, it is due to a deliberate effort by the US government to suppress that knowledge keeping it classified. Here, Jacobsen implies that such information was kept classified to maintain strategic advantages and preparedness against future attacks.

“The U.S. Navy was by far the most powerful maritime fighting force in the world and it was deeply worried about its looming obsolescence in this new age of atomic warfare. So it planned a live-action series of three atomic bomb tests—for all to see. Operation Crossroads was a grand, celebratory affair. A massive, public-relations based military test designed to demonstrate how eighty-eight naval vessels could survive—even thrive—in a future nuclear battle fought at sea. [...] World leaders, journalists, dignitaries, heads of state—they traveled to this far corner of the Pacific to witness the live-fire atomic explosions. This was America’s first use of an atomic weapon since the war. A demonstration of what lay ahead.”

For Jacobsen, the point of origin for the nuclear state was not only the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki but also postwar bureaucratic politics. The US Navy, who was angry that credit for surrender was going to the newly-created Air Force, wanted to reinforce its powerful position and saw nuclear weapons as their way to do so. Jacobsen presents this event as part of the Navy’s efforts to assert its importance in the post-war military landscape.

“[Enrico] Fermi and colleague I.I. Rabi temporarily broke ranks with their weapons-building colleagues and wrote to President Truman, declaring the Super to be ‘an evil thing.’ Their words, in writing: ‘the fact that no limits exist to the destructiveness of this weapon makes its very existence and the knowledge of its construction a danger to humanity as a whole. It is necessarily an evil thing considered in any light.’ But the president ignored the plea to stop building the Super, and Richard Garwin was given the go-ahead to draw the plans.”

There are a handful of dissenting voices throughout the book, many of them who know the truth of nuclear weapons up close. Fermi and Ravi’s opposition to the hydrogen bomb, citing its potential to cause unprecedented destruction, was not acted upon by President Truman. As Jacobsen describes in this quote, the power of groupthink is incredibly powerful. She highlights that the supposed logic of nuclear war is illogical, becoming convincing only if one repeats it often enough.

“It’s important to note that [the estimated death total in a nuclear war] did not account for the 100 million or so Americans who would almost certainly be killed by a Russian equal-measure counterattack. Nor did it account for another 100 million or so people in North and South America who would die from radioactive fallout over approximately the next six months. Or the untold numbers of people who would starve to death from the climate effects of a world set on fire.”

This passage highlights the overwhelming projected scale of human casualties and environmental destruction from nuclear war. In this quote, Jacobsen stresses that such figures can be overwhelming and may lead to the abstraction of the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear attack, which overlooks its destructive underpinnings.

“The Final Solution was enacted. The SIOP never has been—not so far. But a similar, still-classified plan exists today. Over the years, its name has changed. What began as the Single Integrated Operational Plan is Now the Operational Plan, or OPLAN. For the Nuclear Information Project, in consort with the Federation of American Scientists, project director Hans Kristensen and senior researcher Matt Korda have identified the current Operational Plan as OPLAN 8010-12. And that it consists of ‘a family of plans’ directed against four identified adversaries: Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran.’”

This passage compares the ongoing planning for nuclear conflict to historical atrocities like the Holocaust. Here, Jacobsen suggests that detailed and persistent nuclear war plans bear a striking resemblance to strategies aimed at large-scale civilian casualties such as the evil justifications employed by the Nazi regime during the Holocaust.

“As a general rule, missile tests as significant as an ICBM launch are announced, usually to neighbors—through diplomatic channels, back channels, some other kind of channel, but almost always through a channel. Not North Korea. Between January 2022 and May 2023, North Korea test-launched more than 100 missiles, including nuclear-capable weapons that can hit the continental United States. None of them were announced. ‘They want to maintain an element of surprise,’ intelligence analyst Joseph Bermudez Jr. tells us. ‘To reinforce propaganda that they’re a mighty and powerful nation.’”

Of the nine nations that possess nuclear weapons, many have been adversaries at various points in history or been regarded as potentially unstable, but North Korea stands out. North Korea is the only nation that signed onto the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and then withdrew, making its nuclear program a matter of acute concern for the international community. Notably, Jacobsen shows that its practice of conducting missile tests without prior announcement is unlike other nations and a strategy used to maintain secrecy and instigate fear.

“Sensor data from space and ground radar stations around the world inundate Missile Warning Center personnel, propelling them to task. Everyone is working to characterize the incoming threat, Everyone is seeing the same thing. One, single, incoming ICBM. Everyone is thinking the same thing. One nuclear missile doesn’t make any sense. If North Korea really is attacking the U.S. with an ICBM, it will be considered a preemptive, nuclear first strike. If ordered by the president, the response from the U.S. military will be the overwhelming and unconditional use of nuclear force. North Korea will be destroyed.”

This passage examines the rationale behind the response to a single incoming ICBM, noting that such an event would likely trigger a large-scale nuclear retaliation. As Jacobsen makes clear, deterrence is precarious. All it takes is one missile to set the nations of the world on the path to utter annihilation.

“Six minutes. How is that even possible? Six minutes is roughly the amount of time it takes to brew a ten-cup pot of coffee. As former president Ronald Reagan lamented in his memoirs, ‘six minutes to decide how to respond to a blip on a radar scope and decide whether to release Armageddon? How could anyone apply reason at a time like that?’ Nuclear war, we are about to learn, robs men of reason.”

Nuclear war is horrific enough on its own to invoke terror, but many of its factors make it more frightening. Chief among these is the rapid timeline that a nuclear war would likely follow, as Jacobsen emphasizes in stark detail. Here, Jacobsen highlights the urgency and rapid decision-making required in nuclear conflict scenarios. By comparing it to the same amount of time to brew a pot of coffee, Jacobsen emphasizes the difficulty in governmental leaders making rational decisions under such extreme, high-stakes circumstances.

“In the history of warfare, the goal in battle is to meet an attacking sword with defensive shield. The intention of the interceptor missile is to shield the continental U.S. from a limited nuclear attack. ‘Limited’ is the key word here because the total number of interceptor missiles is forty-four. As of early 2024, Russia has 1,674 deployed nuclear weapons, the majority of which are on ready-for-launch status. (China has a stockpile of more than 500; Pakistan and India each have around 165, North Korea has around 50). With forty-four missiles in its entire inventory, the U.S. interceptor program is mostly for show.”

This passage critiques the limited number of US interceptor missiles compared to the vast number of nuclear weapons other countries, such as Russia, possess. Jacobsen shows that current American missile defense capabilities may be insufficient to provide effective protection, despite extensive governmental spending and investment in the area. Here, she highlights that the missile defense program is a show at best.

“The job of FEMA after the invocation of ‘the Program’ boils down to a basic, terrifying concept. ‘Can you keep enough of the government intact?’ [former FEMA director Paul] Fugate asks. ‘The Continuity Program is built around low-probability, high-consequence events,’ he tells us. ‘And it’s built around this concept of no matter how bad something is, [including] a full-blown nuclear exchange, can the government continue to function in a lawful manner? That’s what we [at FEMA] are shooting for.’”

This passage describes FEMA’s focus on maintaining government functionality in the aftermath of a nuclear event, rather than addressing citizens’ suffering and dire circumstances, as they do when responding to other natural disasters. Here, Jacobsen starkly highlights how, if there was a nuclear attack, American citizens would largely be left to fend for themselves.

“In discussing the rules of nuclear war, Garwin, like former secretary of defense Perry, acknowledges that all it takes is one nihilistic madman with a nuclear arsenal to start a nuclear war no one can win. A ruler like the one in this scenario, from North Korea, whose family has managed to rule the country for decades, imposing totalitarian-style martial law and monitoring citizens for the tiniest hint of dissent.”

Deterrence leans upon an assumption of rationality, which falls apart as soon as one person acts irrationally. The leader of North Korea in the book represents one example of such irrationality, guided by totalitarian-style governance. This history lesson reflects on the vulnerability of deterrence strategies due to individual decision-making and rising geopolitical tensions, both of which carry risks of nuclear escalation.

“In the laws of war, there exists a promise among nations never to attack a nuclear reactor. [...] But as history demonstrates, mad rulers disobey rules of war. In words often attributed to Adolf Hitler, ‘if you win, you need not have to explain.’”

In this quote, Jacobsen discusses the violation of established rules of war, such as not attacking a nuclear reactor. As historical precedent shows, leaders often disregard these rules in pursuit of their objectives, however evil, which can lead to broader conflict—including nuclear war.

“The West Coast of America just got hit with a nuclear bomb. This is shocking. This is catastrophic. But most of all, this is terrifying. Deterrence is a psychological phenomenon. A state of mind. Now that deterrence has failed, anything can happen. Anything at all.”

This passage shows that once deterrence fails, the resulting state of chaos can lead to catastrophic, destructive outcomes for life and the environment. Here, Jacobsen highlights that once deterrence loses its value, it cannot be regained, as mayhem and a dangerous path of retaliation will already be underway.

“Like many who became the U.S. secretary of defense, the SecDef in this scenario has spent his life working within the military-industrial complex. This makes him uniquely aware of an existential peril that exists. A terrifying flaw in Mutually Assured Destruction. A kind of hole. Over the North Pole. A weakness that is well known to nuclear weapons experts like Hans Kristensen, but largely ignored by the rest of the world. ‘The Minuteman III ICBM does not have enough range to target North Korea without overflying Russia,’ Kristensen explains. Meaning fifty ICBMs launched from missile fields in Wyoming must travel on a trajectory that flies directly over Russia.”

For deterrence to work, there must be absolute certainty in all respects. Everyone must know what is happening, and the consequences, and have a reasonable assumption of what is motivating their opposites. Jacobsen shows that human psychology does not permit such certainty, especially given the limits of knowledge and time. Physical geography also plays a part, imposing objective conditions for which there is no solution. There is no way to attack North Korea without making Russia wonder if it is the actual target. They can only guess at American intentions, as this passage makes clear.

“The madness of MAD is that the two sides are like a mirror. Like the myth of Narcissus but with a biblical twist: a madman stares in a pond, sees his image on the surface of the water, and mistakes himself for his enemy. Falling for the illusion, he attacks, slips into the water, and drowns. But not before he unleashes Armageddon first.”

MAD was supposed to be a doctrine of stability, believing no one would undertake a reckless action given the certainty of suffering the same fate, but in reality, it is a doctrine of imitation. Jacobsen shows that the stability of one party generally incentivizes the stability of the other. However, on the flip side, the instability of one party changes that incentive. Here, she shows that mutually assured destruction is not just a warning; it is the conclusion foretold in the term.

“Deterrence has failed. So have all theoretical war strategies—passively in place for decades—to further the idea that nuclear weapons make the world a safer place. Euphemistic policies like ‘restoring deterrence,’ ‘escalate to de-escalate,’ and ‘resolve to restrain.’ Policies that in this scenario are revealed to be their own ticking nuclear time bombs. Policies that seem destined to have failed.”

Jacobsen has by this point repeatedly called out the failures of deterrence. Here, this point that failure is absolute is crystal clear in the light of a harsh reality. The use of the word “destined” is particularly noteworthy, as it suggests that deterrence is not merely flawed but rather doomed to fail sooner or later.

“Speaking over the Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite constellation from inside Site R, that just because hundreds of millions of innocent Americans are about to die, maybe the other half of humanity—full of so many innocents—does not have to die. His suggestion gets dismissed without consideration.”

This passage depicts a final, desperate appeal for diplomacy amidst escalating nuclear conflict, which is quickly dismissed. Here, Jacobsen shows that once deterrence fails, efforts to prevent further destruction are futile.

“What will become of humanity after nuclear war? The dinosaurs had a 165 million year run. They came, they dominated, they evolved. then an asteroid hit Earth and the dinosaurs went extinct[.] [...] No trace of the killer reptiles was found by anyone, that we know of, for 66 million years[.] [...] After nuclear war, who, if anyone, will know we were once here?”

This observation reflects on the potential long-term impact of nuclear war on humanity and the environment. By comparing it to past extinctions and considering the possibility of future generations left without evidence of human civilization, Jacobsen shows that powerful leaders are capable of authoring humanity’s destruction.

“In mad king logic, in this scenario, it follows that North Korea’s supreme leader wants to cripple the United States in an act of revenge. Wants to set America back to a time before there was electricity [...] when kings across the world had vast armies and fought their neighbors directly to reclaim conquered lands. All without the threat of America getting involved.”

This passage provides the fullest account in the book of the North Korean leader’s motives. He is not just “mad” but has a political objective: removing the state he feels prevents his quest for glory in his own land. However, Jacobsen highlights that his actions made his goals impossible, destroying his state as well as those of his adversaries—a consequence of nuclear warfare.

“In this post-nuclear world, the tiny-bodied, fast-reproducing species thrive, while the large-bodies animals—including humans—struggle at the edge of extinction. [...] Only time will tell if we humans will survive.”

The final chapter turns to a post-nuclear world where smaller, rapidly-producing species might survive while larger animals, including humans, could face extinction. This quote starkly highlights the long-term consequences of nuclear conflict: one in which human life in the future may not be possible due to human actions in the past.