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Bacon opens by critiquing past approaches to the pursuit of knowledge. Dogmatic scholars shut down further inquiry with their absolute certainty. At the other end of the scale, skeptics assert that nothing can truly be known. Although they used some sound reasoning, their foundations were flawed. The more ancient of the Greeks, whose work is lost, had a moderate approach in between dogmatism and skepticism. Their work was often hindered by expressions of frustration, but they persisted in pursuing the study of nature, optimistic that they could ascertain the truth through practical testing. However, they too lacked a concrete framework for their study, placing too much emphasis on abstract thought.
Bacon then introduces his approach, in which mental reasoning takes the evidence of the senses as its starting point. He asserts that logicians recognize the need for external evidence to support internal reasoning but traditionally apply the senses too late, once the mind has already been shaped. Logic based on flawed premises cannot expose those flaws or establish truth, instead seeming to confirm its own errors. Bacon therefore advocates for an epistemological overhaul, using a set of instructions to direct the mind in its investigations—a “mechanical aid” for investigation. He compares this to physical tools used to enhance humans’ natural physical capabilities for practical tasks—e.g., moving an enormous obelisk. Even if men prepare well, gather in great number, or nominate naturally capable people for the task, they still cannot make progress without tools.
Bacon then lays out two caveats relating to people and things, respectively. First, though he reserves the right to critique the ancients, his method does not aim to compete with them, as it is about establishing an entirely new path. Second, his method is not attempting to do away with current philosophy altogether, which is useful in areas such as civil life, teaching, and debate. His system would not be: It is not relevant to the general population and is not easily understood.
He argues that there should therefore be two approaches that coexist harmoniously. One is a method for disseminating and utilizing existing knowledge in everyday settings, and the other is a method for pursuing new knowledge. Bacon wishes the best to anyone favoring the existing approach, whether due to its applicability to everyday life or their own difficulty with the other approach. However, anyone wishing to actually expand human knowledge should join his method. He names the two methods for clarity: The old method is “the anticipation of the mind,” and his own method is “the interpretation of nature” (7).
Bacon warns that this work cannot be easily understood. No one can be qualified to critique it until they have followed Bacon’s method to understand it, overcome the flaws in their own thinking, and recognized the complexity of nature.
For the remainder of the text, Bacon breaks down his arguments and observations into a series of numbered “aphorisms,” or principles.
Bacon opens by discussing humanity’s potential to expand its knowledge and capabilities. He asserts that knowledge and power are synonymous, as understanding cause is necessary to enact effect. Humans can only operate within the confines of their observational powers, and without tools, these are limited. For example, humans can observe external features of natural phenomena but not internal processes. So far in history, human knowledge—and therefore human ability to manipulate the world—has been minimal. There have been numerous written works, but these are mostly concern the same few ideas. Nothing new can be achieved without trying new methods, and science has been held back by extolling the mind but not searching for tools for it to use.
Due to the incredible complexity of nature, current logic and science are inadequate. Current logic is based on the overly simplistic device of the syllogism, which builds on unfounded ideas. Current science, meanwhile, has only vaguely defined its “notions” (e.g., ideas about forces, types of matter, etc.). Even non-abstract things like immediately perceivable phenomena (heat) or objects (a dog) can get sucked into this confusion, so even forming axioms from these can be flawed. A more precise method is required to discover notions and axioms (statements of truth, or principles).
In Aphorism 19, Bacon contrasts two ways of investigating truth: the current way, which uses minimal engagement with the senses to produce broad axioms and then uses these broad principles to work out more specific axioms, versus his proposed way, which uses careful, precise engagement with the senses to produce narrow axioms and then builds methodically on these to produce broader axioms. Generalities are less work, so people naturally tend toward the former, but this method is hard to correct once begun, while the latter will be more accurate.
There can be a gulf between reality and human beliefs, and axioms produced by discussion alone are unhelpful, as the human mind cannot compete with the complexity of nature; only axioms produced from observing reality can further science. Current axioms derive from very limited observation, and people explain away evidence that doesn’t fit as an exception to the rule rather than using it to inform the axiom.
Bacon refers back to the two approaches he named at the end of the Preface, distinguishing between human reasoning that is applied to nature retrospectively—“the anticipation of nature”—and reasoning that is derived from nature, as he advocates—“the interpretation of nature” (10). He says it is easy to produce assent using the former because a simple, generalized statement is easier to engage with. However, no progress can be made even if all the great thinkers of the ages combined, because the approach is based on flawed principles. Attempting to build upon the flawed foundations of existing science is therefore hopeless. Instead, a great “instauration,” a total reform, must happen. He reiterates that he is not dishonoring the talent of the ancients but rather advocating for a totally new method; he is a “guide rather than […] a critic” (11).
He states that any criticism of his method that is founded on the principles of existing methodology is not valid. It is challenging to express his ideas, as truly new ideas can only be described in reference to existing ideas. He wants to avoid direct engagement with those who differ too much in fundamental principles to understand his method, instead presenting his ideas so that those with the capacity to understand them can adopt them; his method will thus gradually take root, like a nonviolent occupation. People engaged in his method must let go of their old ideas and initially merely observe.
In Aphorism 37, Bacon says that though both his approach and the skeptics’ approach assert that little can be known, the skeptics use this to justify disengaging from seeking knowledge, where he uses this as an argument for engaging with material evidence to expand knowledge.
The title of Bacon’s work alludes to Aristotle’s work Organon, meaning “tool” or “method.” This was a treatise on logic—specifically syllogism—that shaped subsequent approaches to knowledge. Bacon’s Novum Organum aims to discredit these approaches and propose a new one founded on inductive reasoning. The Novum Organum is thus not just a tract about Bacon’s ideas. He argues that the human mind alone is not capable of pursuing knowledge in the best way—it must use tools. He intended his Novum Organum to function as a practical tool: an instructive guide to others for using his method.
The Preface and first 37 aphorisms of Novum Organum serve as an introduction to the work as a whole. Several ideas and arguments that first appear in the Preface resurface in the first few aphorisms of Book 1. This enables Bacon to embellish these further but also embeds them solidly as the foundation upon which the rest of Novum Organum builds. For example, Bacon introduces criticism of logic-based investigation in the Preface, establishing the theme of The Flawed Foundations of Existing Epistemology: He argues that logic “has tended more to confirm errors, than to disclose truth” because of its cursory consideration of external evidence in favor of mental reasoning (5). He develops this further early in Book 1, introducing the “syllogism”: a way of using statements of truth to produce another statement. Bacon presents the syllogism as circular and abstract, with no external input to redirect it if its foundational ideas are incorrect: “[T]here is no solidity in the superstructure” (9). This is a more specific and detailed example of his criticism in the Preface, entrenching his argument. Given the dominance of logic in contemporary epistemology, returning to this topic periodically throughout Novum Organum allows Bacon to continually shore up his position.
However, the importance of addressing this topic is not merely rhetorical, as Bacon explains his own method through oppositional reference to the framework of logic. Both contain the same basic components: evidence from the senses and axioms, or statements of truth. He summarizes inductive versus deductive reasoning in Aphorism 19:
[Deduction] hurries on rapidly from the senses and particulars to the most general axioms, and from them, as principles and their supposed indisputable truth, derives and discovers the intermediate axioms. [Inductive reasoning] constructs its axioms from the senses and particulars, by ascending continually and gradually, till it finally arrives at the most general axioms (9).
His arguments in favor of his own approach relate to the flaws of deductive reasoning: He describes how his method “reject[s] that operation of the mind which follows close upon the senses” (5), advocating a cautious, painstaking use of process where logicians leap to conclusions fast.
Bacon also defines his approach in relation to the opposing forces of dogmatism and skepticism, again introducing these in the Preface and building on them in Book 1. Referencing such large-scale epistemological approaches in the opening paragraph communicates the nature of the work: He is not just proposing a scientific theory about a specific topic but offering an overarching epistemological approach to the pursuit of knowledge.
This first paragraph also gives his own view on these approaches, praising a “more prudent mean, between the arrogance of dogmatism, and the despair of scepticism” (5). He returns to this later in Book 1 when describing his own proposals. Like the skeptics, he acknowledges human fallibility, but he promotes a different course of action in response: They “destroy the authority of the senses and understanding, while we invent and supply them with assistance” (11). By suggesting that the limitations of the senses can be mitigated, he promotes his method as the ultimate “prudent” course first hinted at in the Preface.
Bacon introduces this discussion of dogmatism and skepticism specifically in relation to the ancient Greeks, whom Bacon’s contemporaries saw as foundational to both attitudes. This introduces a major theme of Novum Organum: epistemological history, which forms a crucial component of Bacon’s critique of current epistemology. Bacon not only discusses history but also mines it for examples, and even metaphors, to illustrate his points. For example, in Aphorism 35 he cites a nonviolent French incursion into Italy as a model for his own approach: “Even so do we wish our philosophy to make its way quietly into those minds that are fit for it” (11). He thus couches his aims as peaceful and well-intentioned but ultimately expansionist.
Bacon’s suggestion that only certain minds will be capable of engaging with his method—and his implied dismissal of detractors as simply incapable of understanding—is also an example of his use of persuasive rhetoric. It echoes the Preface, in which Bacon flatters any “true son of science” who dares to “[leave] the antechambers of nature trodden by the multitude” to seek new knowledge (7). He presents his own approach as a marker of intelligence and boldness, encouraging support.
Bacon closes the Preface by presenting a “request,” citing the huge amount of work he has had to do and asking that others withhold judgement until they have done similar work to understand what he is saying. He appeals to justice, given the noble nature of his work: “[I]t is but just that we should obtain this favor from mankind (especially in so great a restoration of learning and the sciences)” (7). He maintains that counterarguments based on existing ways of thinking cannot by their nature be valid, rebuffing potentially criticism as automatically flawed. Framing all this as a “request” gives the paragraph a veneer of politeness, but he uses blunt language to underline that failure to agree indicates inadequacy in the opponent, not his work. This becomes more explicit in the morally inflected language he uses to describe would-be detractors, arguing that any critic must first “correct the depraved and deeply rooted habits of his mind” (7). Bacon uses this persuasive rhetoric throughout Novum Organum, but in this first section it lays the ground for the rest of the work, encouraging a receptive reading of the rest of the text.
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