Most Dangerous: Daniel Ellsberg and the Secret History of the Vietnam War

“He made clear that the strikes would be limited. For months, Johnson had been assuring Americans that he had no intention of expanding the country’s role in Vietnam. As he had put it often, ‘We seek no wider war.’”

President Johnson entered the White House assuring voters that there would not be a full-scale war in Vietnam. However, at the same time, he began planning military action, knowing that the conflict would likely escalate. He kept this information from the American public, which began a pattern of secrets and lies that the US government fell into during the years of the Vietnam War.

“McNamara was blatantly misleading Congress, but aside from Morse, no other senators knew it. Some had misgivings about handing President Johnson what was practically a declaration of war, especially in such a hurry, and with such a vague idea of where things might lead. Still, most saw it as their responsibility to rally around the president.”

After the incident in the Tonkin Gulf, President Johnson presented Congress with a resolution that would grant him the authority to order attacks on Vietnam without the official declaration of war that would alarm the American public. Secretary of Defense McNamara insisted that the attack on American navy ships was unprovoked, even though he knew the ships were in the area to support South Vietnamese forces. Furthermore, there was doubt that the attack had even taken place. Nevertheless, all the senators except for one felt it was their patriotic duty to support the president in times of crisis. This incident highlights how the origins of Vietnam War were murky and were rooted in fear rather than morality or logic.

“Ellsberg was new to Washington, but he was not naïve. He knew the government did not really function like the neat little charts in some middle-school civics textbook. Yes, Johnson and McNamara were telling Congress and the public only part of the story of recent events in Vietnam. But secrecy was an essential element of military operations, and Ellsberg was not one to blow the whistle. ‘I really looked down on people who had done that,’ he said of insiders who leaked secrets. ‘You shouldn’t play the game that way.’”

When Ellsberg begins working at the Pentagon, he is surprised by the number of top-secret documents and all the decisions made outside of the public eye. However, he felt that his duty was to support his government, and he trusted that secrets were kept for good reasons. His initial opinions about this vary greatly from his actions later in the book, which highlight the seriousness of the events that cause him to change his mind.

“Nguyen grew up watching French colonists abusing workers at plantations and mines, ripping out and exporting the country’s natural resources. He joined anti-French protests as a teenager. In his twenties he became a communist; communism’s promise to redistribute land and wealth among the people seemed an attractive alternative to French oppression.”

This passage describes the childhood and adolescence of Ho Chi Minh, the leader of the Vietnamese independence movement. The context of his early life in colonial Vietnam offers an important insight into why the US could not beat the North Vietnamese. For the Vietnamese, the war was personal. Ho Chi Minh’s entire life was devoted to fighting for independence, and he was motivated by the years spent watching the abuse and exploitation of his people at the hands of French colonists.

“Yes, the United States supported every country’s right to self-determination—in theory. In the real world, Ho Chi Minh and his followers were Communists. An independent Vietnam might ally itself with the Soviet Union. Truman’s other option was to back France. With World War II over, France wanted its old colony back. French rule in Vietnam would deny power to the Communists.

Which goal was more important: supporting Vietnam’s right to independence, or containing the spread of communism?”

Here, Sheinkin describes the United States’ refusal to recognize Vietnam as an independent nation after World War II. Despite its supposed commitment to freedom and independence, the US chose to support France’s bid to reclaim Vietnam as a colony rather than support communist Vietnamese sovereignty. This passage indicates the country’s long, indirect involvement in Vietnam and shows the hypocrisy of the United States’ supposed mission of spreading freedom around the globe.

“Should the United States commit to fighting a major ground war in Vietnam? It would prove to be one of the most important debates in American history, and it took place entirely in secret.”

As the conflict in Vietnam escalated, President Johnson could no longer postpone making a choice about sending American troops to fight. He had to commit to the war or commit to losing Vietnam to communism. This was a big decision, but it was kept a secret, and the public was not allowed a say in the matter.

“Lady Bird Johnson knew the stress was reaching new heights when the president began pacing the White House halls at night. Night after night, in dressing gown and slippers, carrying a flashlight, Johnson would walk from his bedroom down to the situation room in the basement. There was nothing he could do at that hour. But it was more peaceful than the nightmares that tormented his sleep.”

This passage reveals the emotional strain that the Vietnam War put on President Johnson. He disliked escalating the war in Vietnam, but he knew he would be criticized for losing Vietnam to communism. Unwilling to risk his political reputation by becoming the first president to lose a war, Johnson continued to escalate the conflict despite the doubts and nightmares he experienced. He lacked Personal Integrity in the Face of Political and Social Pressure, which led to a wide conflict and the loss of many lives.

“In early 1966, Robert McNamara reached the conclusion that the United States could not win the Vietnam War. But he was unwilling to confront President Johnson. In public, he continued to support escalation. Privately, he began airing grave doubts.”

This passage describes Secretary of Defense McNamara’s realization that victory in Vietnam was impossible. However, as the man responsible for much of the US policy in Vietnam, he didn’t want to admit his failure. It took nearly a year before McNamara began urging President Johnson against further escalation.

“As the sky grew dark, the exhausted Americans sat on the ground gulping water from canteens and licking melted chocolate bars from the wrappers. Ellsberg remembered the stories he’d read in school of the American Revolution, of young British soldiers in heavy packs and red uniforms marching around the New England woods, taking fire from the cover of trees and stone walls, chasing a highly motivated enemy that moved faster and knew the local geography better.”

During Ellsberg’s time in Vietnam, he observed combat with American patrols. During these patrols, the frustration among the American soldiers was palpable. They rarely engaged with the enemy, and there were no visible signs of progress. Here, Ellsberg reflects that the American troops are like the British soldiers fighting in the American Revolution. The Vietnamese have an advantage because they are motivated to fight for their freedom and can move easily in the familiar terrain, just as the Indigenous people had these same advantages over the British settlers during the American Revolution.

“The president grappled with the usual indecision. He was terrified of losing the war, and scared of sparking wider protests. As he’d done several times before, he compromised.”

Sheinkin describes President Johnson’s continued struggle with the growing war in Vietnam. As the conflict escalated and more American troops were killed, the pressure to win the war became more extreme. However, at the same time, the possibility of victory appeared ever more unlikely.

“What really struck Ellsberg was that government leaders seemed to have learned nothing from three years of failure in Vietnam. Even more maddening was the lack of any sense of urgency to change course.”

When Ellsberg returned from Vietnam, he believed he could share what he had learned and influence the US war effort. However, all the officials he spoke with insisted that the war was going well and victory was close at hand. None were willing to admit even the possibility of the war’s failure. When confronted with this unfounded stubbornness, Ellsberg's opinion of governmental secrecy began to change.

“The impact was immediate. Members of Congress started speaking out against further troop increases. Senator William Fulbright, who had helped steer the Tonkin Gulf Resolution through Congress, now declared that he regretted that action. Previously, Johnson had increased troop levels in Vietnam little by little, without making dramatic announcements. Thanks to the leak, that was no longer an option.”

This passage describes a leaked story in The New York Times regarding another increase of US troops in Vietnam. The story caused an uproar; members of Congress spoke out against the war, and President Johnson lost his ability to quietly send more troops to Vietnam. For the first time, Ellsberg realized that leaking classified documents could have a positive impact.

“What does it say about a man’s character that he would sabotage peace talks to win votes? To Nixon, that’s just how the game was played. Politics and elections were high-stakes fights, not for the faint of heart. ‘And,’ he told aides, ‘I play it gloves off.’”

Richard Nixon ran in the 1968 presidential election on an antiwar platform. He began to lose his lead against his opponent when peace talks began in Vietnam. Desperate not to lose his advantage, he influenced South Vietnam to postpone the talks until after the election. This act reveals the self-serving stance that Nixon would take throughout his presidency. By saying he faces things with his “gloves off,” Nixon meant that he wasn’t afraid to fight, further showing that he was proud of his underhanded dealings as long as they led him to victory.

“Nixon was well aware that voters had not elected him to escalate the war. To keep the Cambodia operation secret, the military prepared phony reports for Congress, stating that the bombs were actually falling on Vietnam.”

Like his predecessor, President Johnson, Nixon escalated the conflict in Vietnam while promising Congress and the public that the war was ending. The impulse to lie about the reality in Vietnam had been well-established, and Nixon continued to invent falsehoods to protect his political reputation from the increasingly unpopular war.

“Now it hit him full force. In over twenty years of war, the United States had never actually tried to win. Each president, of course, had hoped to win, and had wanted to win. And yet what the Pentagon Papers showed was that each president made decisions to escalate American involvement in Vietnam knowing that what he was doing had little chance of success. Time and time again, military leaders told presidents what it would take to win. Time and time again, presidents escalated—but stopped short of giving the generals what they said they needed.”

Reading the Pentagon Papers, Ellsberg was shocked by the realization that no US president had tried to win the Vietnam War. Each president had continued escalating the conflict but stopped short of committing to a degree that would ensure victory because the loss of American troops would be impossibly high. The war was essentially un-winnable, but presidents continued fighting because they wanted to avoid the humiliation of losing the war.

“It was the exact dilemma Ellsberg faced. Releasing a secret document he had essentially stolen from Rand was a betrayal of Rowen’s trust and would hurt him, both personally and professionally. But not releasing the document was, in Ellsberg’s view, another form of betrayal: a betrayal of the country he loved, and the people who were still dying in Vietnam.”

When Ellsberg decided to release the Pentagon Papers, he knew that many of his close friends and colleagues would see the act as a betrayal. He risked losing friendships and ruining the careers of his coworkers. However, he felt that continuing to keep the classified documents a secret was a bigger betrayal.

“Max Frankel asked the group to consider the risks of publishing classified documents in a time of war. Was the story important enough to justify defying the government? Was it worth facing legal action? All agreed that it was. They turned to the lawyer.”

This passage shows the discussion at The New York Times before the staff decided to publish the Pentagon Papers. The paper faced many significant risks, including possible fines or jail time. However, the reporters, editors, and publishers felt it was their responsibility to bring the truth to the public.

“The paper would be prosecuted under the Espionage Act, warned Louis Loeb, one of the firm’s partners. The editors would wind up in jail. What’s more, he insisted, making the Pentagon Papers public was just plain wrong. The government had deemed the information secret, and it was not up to any individual or newspaper to blow the whistle. ‘It’s a matter of patriotism,’ Loeb insisted.”

Here, The New York Times’s lawyer argues against printing the Pentagon Papers. He expresses the point of view that leaking classified documents is unpatriotic. The government has important reasons for keeping information secret from the public, and the media and public should support the government, especially in times of crisis. His arguments convey the complexities behind The Ethics of Whistleblowing.

“Cronkite asked what Ellsberg thought was the most important lesson Americans should take from the Pentagon Papers.

‘I think the lesson,’ Ellsberg answered, ‘is that the people of this country can’t afford to let the president run the country by himself.’”

Appearing for his first interview after leaking the Pentagon Papers, Ellsberg reminded the American public that the US is “a self-governing country” (244). The public plays an important role in a functioning democracy and must ensure that the government is doing the people’s will. To do this, the public needs to know what the government is up to. If the president is left to “run the country by himself,” the system becomes vulnerable to corruption and the abuse of power.

“For the lawyers, meanwhile, this was a difficult case to prepare for. Lawyers like to study precedents, similar cases that have come before. There were none. The government had never prosecuted anyone for leaking secret documents. One of the team, Leonard Boudin, explained to Ellsberg that to prove espionage, the government would have to show that Ellsberg had damaged national security—something Ellsberg obviously didn’t feel he’d done.”

Ellsberg’s trial was the first of its kind. His crime hinged on the question of national security. The government is only allowed to keep secrets from the public if the information could threaten national security, so Ellsberg could only be prosecuted if the government proved the Pentagon Papers were dangerous and compromised national security.

“There was no mention, in his tribute, of Nixon’s efforts to undermine Johnson’s peace talks four years before. No mention that since then more than twenty thousand Americans had died in Vietnam—all to achieve a lousy deal that allowed North Vietnam’s army to stay in the South, making a lasting peace impossible. No mention that neither Nixon nor Kissinger expected their ‘peace with honor’ to actually end the killing.”

In January 1973, the US finally signed a peace agreement with North Vietnam. Nixon claimed that the agreement was his much-touted “peace with honor,” but he once again lied to the American public about the integrity of the deal and the reality of a lasting peace. In doing so, he hoped to continue postponing the inevitable failure in Vietnam so it would not tarnish his political reputation.

“Speaking almost in a whisper at first, Ellsberg told the jury he had been a hawk when the Vietnam War began. He detailed his role in helping to plan the early bombing campaigns and told how two years in Vietnam had changed his views. He described scenes of devastation—forests turned to deserts by American chemicals, villages burning, children wounded by American bombs. He described the time he had watched a young girl poking through the wreckage of her home, lifting the charred remains of her doll.

When the court recessed for lunch, Ellsberg walked to the defense table, fell into a chair, and sobbed. Patricia came up and sat beside him.”

Ellsberg was deeply affected by his experiences in Vietnam and came to feel great remorse for his early role in planning the war. One of the reasons he felt such a profound moral obligation to release the Pentagon Papers was because he felt partly responsible for the continued suffering that the war produced.

“Ellsberg, a self-described ‘Watergate junkie,’ watched the drama speed toward its climax. He had risked everything to help end the American war in Vietnam. What struck him now was the realization that, in a winding and utterly unpredictable way, he might have accomplished his goal. ‘Nixon’s effort to get me was the foundation of Watergate,’ Ellsberg reasoned. ‘And without Watergate, I think Nixon might have been able to keep up the bombing of Vietnam indefinitely.’”

Nixon’s chaotic attempts to punish Ellsberg for the leak resulted in the infamous Watergate scandal. Ironically, the investigation into Watergate and the corruption it revealed in the White House made Nixon too politically weak to continue the war in Vietnam. He wanted to continue bombing the North, but Congress would not approve his plans, and he was unable to veto their decision.