Justice

Aristotle’s political philosophy has two central ideas. First, justice is “teleological”; to define rights, we must “figure out the telos (the purpose, end, or essential nature) of the social practice in question” (186). Second, justice is “honorific”; the telos of a practice depends, at least in part, on the “virtues it should honor and reward” (186). Thus, unlike the theories discussed in the previous chapters, Aristotle does not seek to “separate questions of fairness and rights from arguments about honor, virtue, and moral desert” (186).

For Aristotle, people get what they deserve according to “merit” (187). Thus, flutes should go to the best flute players, not the wealthiest or some other criterion that is not relevant to flute playing. A utilitarian would agree with this because it would make listeners better off and achieve the greatest happiness for the greatest number, but Aristotle’s reason would be that flutes are intended to produce excellent music, and therefore they should go to those who can best “realize this purpose” (187). This is an example of “teleological reasoning”; that is, reasoning from the “purpose of a good to the proper allocation of the good” (187-88).

To analyze affirmative action using Aristotle’s approach, we would first examine the purpose of a university by considering what “virtues […] universities properly honor and reward” (191).