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History of the Peloponnesian War

Nonfiction | Book | Adult

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Symbols & Motifs

Rhetoric and Language

Thucydides is said to be notoriously difficult to translate, and scholars have vigorously debated his text. Such debates about words and their meaning are themselves fitting to Thucydides’ work. He acknowledges that his “history will seem less easy to read because of the absence in it of a romantic element” (47-48). He states that he is not trying to entertain but to educate: Unlike poets and “prose chroniclers,” Thucydides is concerned with conveying truths about the war and, more broadly, human nature that will benefit his audiences. His dense and difficult style may be a product of his intention to employ language in the service of analysis and enduring truth rather than flights of fancy and fleeting entertainment.

Thucydides employs two conventions that appear in ancient Greek literature and philosophy in 5th-century Athens: speeches and dialogue.The History of the Peloponnesian War contains a total of 141 speeches delivered by Spartans, Athenians, and allies on both sides and one dialogue, "The Melian Dialogue." Among the speeches, Pericles’ Funeral Oration, delivered in Book 2, is one of the most famous.

Thucydides claims to reproduce speeches and dialogue in their speakers’ own words. He then adds, contradictorily, that owing to lapses of memory he had to creatively reconstruct speeches he heard himself or secondhand, from eyewitnesses. His method, he says, is to keep “as closely as possible to the general sense of the words that were actually used, to make the speakers say what, in my opinion, was called for by each situation” (47). Given this, historians even in ancient times questioned the accuracy of the speeches. Contemporary scholars have noted that the speeches appear to be in Thucydides’ own voice and style.

Questions of accuracy aside, public speaking and rhetoric were highly-valued skills in 5th-century Athens, owing to the rise of democracy and debate. Speeches and dialogues became crucial mediums for political debate, decision-making, and philosophical development. Though the term rhetoric has become associated with argumentation that masks the truth, 5th-century Athenians believed the opposite. For them, rhetoric and debate were means of arriving at the truth. Thus Cleon’s complaint to the Athenian assembly in Book 3—that Athenians are swayed by novel arguments, are “victims of your own pleasure in listening,” and behave like an audience at a lecture rather “than a parliament discussing matters of state”—is a serious accusation (214). In response, Diodotus effectively scolds Cleon, saying “I do not share the view which we have heard expressed, that it is a bad thing to have frequent discussions on matters of importance,” adding that a “good citizen, instead of trying to terrify the opposition, ought to prove his case in fair argument” (217-18). Thus argument is not window dressing but a means for discovering truth.

In oligarchic Sparta, speakers did, as in Athens, present arguments to a voting body, but their speeches tended to be shorter and more concise, as suggested in Book 1: King Archidamus of Sparta gives a long, well-thought out speech urging Sparta not to rush into war. A Spartan ephor, Sthenelaidas, replies, “I do not understand these long speeches which the Athenians make” (86). King Archidamus had been friends with Pericles prior to the outbreak of war and as a result was now accused of being weak and sympathetic to Athens. Thus Sthenelaidas’ response uses few but biting words to reiterate a popular accusation. In a wry moment in Book 4, Thucydides alludes to the Spartans’ reputation for simple speech: He says of general Brasidas, “[h]e was not at all a bad speaker either, for a Spartan” (315).

While 5th-century Greeks generally saw rhetoric as a means of arriving at truth, they were not, according to Thucydides, above manipulating language’s meaning. During the plague, for example, Athenians argue about prophecies and their interpretation, with people adapting their “memories” of an oracle “to suit their sufferings” (156). Perhaps the most serious breach of rhetoric’s moral intent occurs during the civil wars that break out across the Hellenic world, when words “change their usual meanings” (243). In the past, what would have been:

described as a thoughtless act of aggression was now regarded as the courage one would expect to find in a party member; to think of the future and wait was merely another way of saying one was a coward; any idea of moderation was just an attempt to disguise one’s unmanly character (243).

Words become twisted into vehicles for manipulation and control.

Finally, in Book 7, Thucydides notes that Nicias sends a letter, rather than a messenger, to Athens because he feared “that the messengers might not report the facts as they really were, either through lack of ability in speaking, or bad memory or a desire to say something which would please the general mass of opinion” (483). A letter would transmit his views “without having them distorted in the course of transmission” (483). This reflects the growing importance of written language in 5th-century Greece.

The Fragility of Human Endeavors

Thucydides repeatedly draws attention to the ways humans are vulnerable. Thus, this motif relates to and helps develop Thucydides’ overarching theme throughout the history. Homeric myths explore the ways humans are vulnerable to the whims of the gods. In The Iliad, soldiers may be struck down or spirited away due to a god’s displeasure or favor. In The Odyssey, Odysseus suffers many trials on his journey home by boat due to having incurred the wrath of Poseidon, god of the seas. In Thucydides’ text, humans are also vulnerable but to forces of chance, nature, and their own bad decisions.

This vulnerability is threaded throughout the text, such as when the plague breaks out in Athens, when a tsunami washes away a city, when a storm harms one side and helps the other’s, and when fortifications collapse or are breached.

One of the book’s most famous examples concerns the launch and destruction of Athens’ Sicilian expedition. The Athenians launch the expedition at the end of Book 6 with enthusiasm, optimism, and much pomp. Thucydides describes the fleet that first set sail in 415 as “by a long way the most costly and the finest-looking force of Hellenic troops that up to that time had ever come from a single city” (428). He describes the considerable resources that were devoted to amassing this fleet and the pride, prayers, and libations that accompanied its launch. Two years later, the entire expedition would be wiped out in what Thucydides describes as “the most calamitous of defeats” (537). The Athenians were “utterly and entirely defeated; their sufferings were on an enormous scale; their losses were, as they say, total; army, navy, everything was destroyed” (537). 

Power and Corruption

For Thucydides, power is not in itself a negative force. Rather, it is immoderate lust for power than corrupts humans. Thucydides states this in Book 3, after civil war breaks out on the island of Corcyra. Pro-democracy factions gain power and massacre their internal enemies, claiming to be safeguarding their democracy. In actuality, Thucydides says, men were killed on the grounds of personal hatred or because they were owed money. Thucydides concludes that “these evils” happened due to “[l]ove of power, operating through greed and through personal ambition” (243). The events on Corcyra are simply the first in a cycle of civil strife, which fuels power struggles as men jockey for power and the stakes increasingly rise.

Thucydides highlights the difference between power used well and power abused in his analyses of Pericles, Cleon, and Alcibiades. According to Thucydides, Pericles “wisely led and firmly guarded, and it was under him that Athens was at her greatest” (163). He understood what was at stake in the war and what Athens needed to do to win. He was intelligent, had integrity, and “could respect the liberty of the people and at the same time hold them in check” (164). Pericles’ patriotism, rather than love for power, informed his leadership.

In the cases of Cleon and Alcibiades, desire for power informs their leaderships. Cleon is known “for the violence of his character” and argues in favor of massacring Mytilene’s entire male population in Book 3 (212). In Book 4, he convinces Athenians to reject Sparta’s request for peace, and in Book 5, he senses his troops are growing restless and leads them into a battle they are ill-equipped for, rather than suffer their grumbling. Alcibiades came into prominence young, owing to family connections, and felt a potent need to prove himself. He allows personal animosities to dictate his actions, as when, in Book 6, he argues for launching the Sicilian expedition because he dislikes Nicias and wants to oppose him. Thucydides notes that Athenians became “frightened at a quality in him” and feared him “becoming a dictator” (418-19). This fear is later proved legitimate as Alcibiades flees to Sparta then befriends the Persian Tissiphernes, and, in the final years of the war, is instrumental in installing oligarchy in Athens.

Two important abuses of power in the text are the destruction of Melos and the Sicilian expedition. In the case of the former, the Melians wanted to maintain neutral and friendly relations with Athens. Athens, however, wanted to demonstrate its power to its other subject states and refused to accept Melos’ decision to remain neutral and massacred the population. The massacre is considered one of Athens’ worst atrocities, and even contemporaneous Athenian patriots denounced it. In the case of the Sicilian expedition, Athens’ sought to expand its empire and replenish its finances. They rejected opportunities to withdraw for fear of looking weak and walking away from such a costly expedition with nothing. Ultimately, Athens became enamored of its greatness and began to think more about preserving its power and status than preserving its people. In the end, it lost both.

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