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Thucydides introduces himself as an Athenian, explains his method, and provides an overview of the Hellenic people and their history. He chose to write about the war, he says, because it is the most significant one that has yet occurred: It broke out when Sparta and Athens were at the height of their powers, and the entire “Hellenic world” was on “one side or the other” (36).
He contrasts his method with that of poets, who exaggerate and thus cannot be trusted: Their goal is to create a pleasing story for the moment, whereas Thucydides aims to create a document that will “last forever” (48). He asserts that his evidence is more credible than the verses of poets because he relies on eye-witness accounts that he cross-references. He also reproduces speeches he heard delivered before and during the war, though he admits he cannot remember their exact wording. With speeches he heard from informants, he attempts to keep “as closely as possible to the general sense of the words” actually used but “to make the speakers say what, in my opinion, was called for by each situation” (47). Though he acknowledges his factual account may be less enjoyable to read, he will be happy if his words prove useful to people who want to understand past events that will likely repeat, since human nature does not change.
Thucydides discuses Greece’s past, explaining that Hellenic states worked together during the Persian invasions but immediately after split into two groups, one that followed democratic Athens and the other oligarchic Sparta. Athens claimed supremacy at sea and Sparta claimed supremacy on land. Athens collected from its allies monetary contributions (called tributes), or naval fleets. Sparta did not require tributes but ensured that Spartan-friendly oligarchies ruled their allied states.
The Peloponnesian War began when Athens and Sparta broke their Thirty Years Peace. Thucydides promises to explain the complaints the two states leveled against each other, though he says they disguise the war’s true cause, which is that Sparta feared Athens’ growing power in the region. The following three disputes comprise the “openly expressed” reasons for the two states breaking their peace.
Spartan ally Corinth and Athenian ally Corcyra both have claims over Epidamnus, a territory located to the east of the Ionic Gulf. Their disputes lead to a war, which Corcyra wins.
Angry over the war’s outcome, Corinth spends the following year building its navy, provoking alarm in Corcyra. Both states send representatives to Athens, explaining what it has to gain from aligning with their state. Corcyra’s navy and geographical location make an appealing ally for Athenians, who believe war with Sparta is inevitable. Corinth and Corcyra fight an inconclusive naval battle that both states claim to have won. Though they do not fight in the battle, Athens provides support to Corcyra, which Corinth believes violates their peace treaty.
Though a colony of Corinth, Potidaea is a tribute-paying ally of Athens. Athens fears that Corinth and Macedonia’s King Perdiccas will incite Potidaea to revolt, in particular because Perdiccas has been contriving to involve Sparta in a war against Athens and incite revolt in Thrace and Boeotia. Meanwhile, Sparta has promised to invade Attica if the Athenians attack Potidaea. When Athenians arrive in the region to find Potidaea and other cities in revolt, a battle ensues between Sparta, Athens, and their allies. Athens routs the Potidaean and Peloponnesian army, which flees its fortifications, and blockades Potidaea by land and sea.
Despite Corinth and Athens’ disputes, Athens’ treaty with Sparta remains in effect. Corinth sends delegates to Sparta and invites other allies who feel they have suffered Athenian aggression. At an assembly, they accuse Athens of enslaving Hellenic people and blame Sparta’s inaction for enabling the “enemy’s expansion” (75). Spartan King Archidamus urges caution, warns that a war against Athens would be a protracted affair, and proposes sending a messenger to Athens to air grievances and arrange an arbitration. An ephor (a Spartan magistrate) follows with a short speech encouraging Sparta not to betray its allies and to declare war before Athens grows stronger. The assembly votes that Athens has broken the treaty.
Thucydides reiterates that Sparta went to war not so much because of its allies’ speeches but from fear that Athens was growing powerful and had “a greater part of Hellas” under its control (87).
Thucydides discusses the ~50-year period between the end of the Persian War and the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, during which the Athenian empire grew and tensions with Sparta amplified.
Two inciting events occur in 479 and 466, respectively. After the Persian defeat of 479, Athens seeks to rebuild its protective walls against Sparta’s wishes. Athenian leader Themistocles engages in subterfuge to ensure the walls are built before Sparta formally objects to the construction. Tensions between Sparta and Athens heighten further in 466 when an earthquake in Sparta leads to a major slave revolt. Sparta appeals to their allies for help, and Athens sends troops to assist. However, Sparta sends them home, fearing that Athenians will sponsor “revolutionary policy” in the Peloponnese (95). Athens is offended, denounces their alliance with Sparta, and creates a new one with Argos, Sparta’s enemy.
Following the Persian War, combined Hellenic forces travel the region to reoccupy Persian-controlled cities. Favorably for Athens’ growth of power, they are left in charge after the Spartans recall one of their leaders for bad behavior. Also during this time, Athens is able to force smaller Hellenic states into tributary alliances because Athens bore the brunt of the fighting against Persia, leaving smaller states dependent on them. Using their allies’ resources, Athens strengthens its naval power, thereby centralizing control of the Aegean around Attica. Between 460 and 445, various political and military conflicts break out across the Hellenic world. Sparta and Athens’ actions on behalf of their allies bring them into conflict by proxy. Though they establish the Thirty Years’ Peace in 446, in an attempt to avoid a direct conflict from breaking out, it proves difficult to sustain.
During the ~50-year period during which the above events take place, Athens seeks to expand its empire, and Sparta, “being traditionally slow to go to war,” does not stop them (103). They are also distracted by wars in their own lands, the slave rebellion in particular. When Athens begins “to encroach upon Sparta’s allies,” Sparta decides to act (103). They consult the oracle at Delphi and interpret it favorably then assemble their allies to vote on a declaration of war. A Corinthian representative addresses the assembly to argue in favor of war, and in the ensuing vote, the majority vote in favor of it.
To establish a pretext for war, the Spartans send embassies to Athens with demands they know will not be met. Discussing one of these demands leads Thucydides to tell tangential stories about two leaders, Pausanias of Sparta and Themistocles of Athens. Pausanias engages in various intrigues designed to increase his power and prestige at Sparta’s expense. His betrayal is discovered, and the Spartans put him to death. Themistocles is accused of collaborating with Persia but escapes before he can be arrested.
The Athenians refuse Sparta’s demands concerning allies in Potidaea, Aegina, and Megara. Sparta sends a final embassy to offer peace if the Athenians will “give the Hellenes their freedom” (117). Athens discusses the matter in its assembly. Pericles tells the assembly that Sparta is plotting against Athens. Though their treaty states that conflicts will be resolved by arbitration, Sparta never requests it or accepts Athens’ offers for it. He notes Sparta’s military and financial disadvantages and dismisses its ability to fortify Attic cities. He asserts the importance of seapower, at which Athens excels. He tells his fellow Athenians that he does not fear the enemy’s strategies, but rather Athens’ own mistakes. He urges citizens not to attempt to increase the empire while they are at war. He recommends asking Sparta to submit to arbitration per the terms of their treaty and neither starting nor resisting hostilities. Pericles tells the Athenians to face the inevitability of war and live up to the daring, nerve, and sacrifice their fathers demonstrated against the Persians.The Athenians vote to follow Pericles’ advice. Communication continues between the states, but events are clearly leading to war.
Book 1, the longest of the history, covers the prelude to the war. Thucydides discusses his method and provides an overview of the conflicts between Athens and Sparta. He begins with disputes that broke out after the two states combined forces to repel the Persian invasion of 480 BC and follows events through to Sparta’s declaration of war and Pericles’ response in 432-31 BC. The first book does not follow a strict chronology. He covers the dispute of 435-432 before discussing the ~50 years between the wars, from 479-431, though later books will largely progress chronologically.
A central question scholars ask is, can Thucydides be trusted? Historians have traditionally been divided on this question and trust some elements of his history but not others. Though Thucydides likely read existing documents about the war, he does not name them in his text, a source of frustration for contemporary scholars.
Recording factual history was a new concept in 5th-century-BC Athens and was tied to inquiry: “Historein” is the Greek word for “inquiry.” The first historian was Herodotus, who was born and raised at the beginning of the 5th century. Persia’s two invasions of and defeats by Greece—in 490 and 480—occurred during his childhood. Greece’s victory was, for Herodotus, a heroic story that he credited to Athens’ exemplary moral and political guidance and that should be recorded for posterity. Thus, he wrote Greece’s first history book. While Thucydides does not mention Herodotus in The History of the Peloponnesian War, his method seems to attempt to correct what he perceived as limitations in his predecessor’s approach, in particular the unreliability of stories about the distant past, which do not allow for cross-examination of multiple eyewitness accounts. While Thucydides did not believe the past could be known definitely, he does draw conclusions about the past as a way to justify his work. The most glaring example is his claim that the Peloponnesian War is the greatest in Greek history. Thucydides also picks up where Herodotus left off: the end of the Persian War.
While Thucydides’ approach was unique, in a sense it logically follows from the ancient Greeks’ deep connection to their past, as well as political and philosophical developments in 5th-century-BC thought. The Greeks’ attachment to their past is exemplified in the myths that instilled a sense of shared identity and provided a moral education. 5th-century philosophers and medical writers had begun to question these myths and develop rational approaches to ethics and being, but they were not applying their approaches to historical events, especially contemporaneous ones. Scholars have credited the introduction of democracy in the 5th century with enabling or inspiring Thucydides’ approach. Political, financial, judicial, and legal matters were debated openly among, and decided by, ordinary citizens, rather than by kings or other rulers. Discussion and debate were social responsibilities in a democracy and, if conducted wisely and ethically, would lead to discovery and adoption of the strongest ideas.
Among the events he discusses, Thucydides draws few but significant generalizations and provides commentaries judiciously. His emphasis is on causal patterns. For example, he tells the stories of Pausanias and Themistocles, which seem tangential, because their actions ultimately impacted the relationship between Sparta and Athens. Thucydides also differentiates between expressed and underlying causes for conflict. The first can be determined from what is openly stated (for example, in speeches made by Spartans), while the second is discovered through inquiry and analysis.
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By Thucydides