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Conjectures and Refutations
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Part 2, Chapters 15-20Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Part 2: “Refutations”
Part 2, Chapter 15 Summary: “What Is Dialectic?”
Chapter 15 is separated into three parts. It first traces the origin of the dialectic theory proposed by philosopher Hegel, then discusses its development and use in the field of philosophy, and finally criticizes its limitations.
1. Dialectic Explained
The chapter begins with a quote by French philosopher René Descartes: “There is nothing we can imagine, however absurd or incredible, that has not been maintained by one philosopher or another” (312).
Popper believes this to be true and adds that this applies not only to philosophy, but to any field involving human thought and enterprise, such as physics, technology, engineering, and politics. This is because the process of acquiring knowledge is one of trial and error: People that wish to solve a problem will test various methods until they approach a solution. Their chances of success depend on the number and variety of the trials they undertake, and the more numerous and diversified these tests are, the higher the likelihood of solving the problem. This is the fundamental process of adaptation used by living organisms.
There is another method by which knowledge might be advanced. When people encounter a problem and propose a theory, they either cling to the theory for as long as they can, or they fight against it once they realize it is no longer viable. It is this act of fighting that leads to new discoveries. This is what Popper calls the “struggle of ideologies.” He maintains that there are few instances in which the development of thought is a slow, steady, and continuous process of incremental development—progress in human knowledge happens primarily by trial and error or by the struggling of ideologies.
The scientific method was developed from a process of consciously applying the method of trial and error. It is the act of formulating a tentative theory to resolve a problem. This theory is tested and provisionally accepted, until it is replaced in part or in its totality by a more risky and more rigorously testable successor.
In a similar vein, the dialectic theory posits that there are three steps in the development of human thought: Thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. These three steps form the dialectic triad. There is first a proposed thesis, which forwards an idea or argument. This thesis will encounter opposition because it will have weak spots. Then, the struggle between the thesis and its antithesis will persist until a solution is reached, which transcends both the thesis and antithesis, because it is a compromise that preserves their merits and avoids their limitations. This final step is temporarily called the synthesis, but one day, it will in turn become the first step in another dialectic triad.
Some confuse the trial-and-error theory with the dialectic. Popper argues that they are not the same, and that the trial-and-error method theory is much more flexible. For one, it does not state that there must be a synthesis that amounts to a compromise between two opposing theories—it instead claims that a new, more testable, and precise theory will replace its older counterpart. For another, it does not limit the deliberation process to a force and its counterforce: Multiple theories offering various perspectives can all be mutually compared and tested.
The fundamental difference between the two, however, lies in the fact that the trial-and-error theory is content with dismissing the entirety of a theory if a better alternative exists. The dialectic, however, always insists that there must be more to be said about the old theory worthy of consideration, even if it has been disproven. Without this compromise, a synthesis cannot be reached.
Dialecticians therefore consider, wrongly, that contradictions between theories should not be avoided because they are fundamental to the process of creating a transcendent synthesis. They are fundamental to the struggle between thesis and antithesis. However, Popper asserts that this claim is in fact an attack against traditional logic, which dictates that two contradictory statements cannot both be true. Dialecticians maintain that traditional logic should be rejected in favor of the superior dialectic logic.
Popper criticizes the dialectic logic because this attack on traditional logic is not founded upon any concrete evidence; it is merely a “loose and woolly way of speaking” (316). This is because contradictions remain useful to the growth of human knowledge only so long as they are still considered problems that must be solved. Once they are welcomed as food for thought rather than very real problems, there is no longer any intellectual progress to be had. If people decided to put up with contradictions, there would be no incentive to change a theory even if it were contradictory. Thus, the dialectician must decide between welcoming contradictions and not accepting them, or accepting them and the inevitable cessation of real criticism, discussion, and intellectual progress.
Popper uses logic to prove that if contradictions were accepted, then absolutely anything, even absurdities, could be inferred using valid rules of inference. He proposes the following scenario:
Let p stand for the statement “Socrates is wise.”
Let q stand for the statement “Peter is a king.”
Let v stand for “and/or.”
The assertion p v q can be read as: “Socrates is wise and/or Peter is a king.” This statement will always be true if at least one of the premises is true (i.e., Socrates is indeed wise, Peter is indeed a king, or both). It is false only if both premises are false.
Assuming that the premise p is always true (Socrates is indeed wise), we can insert any statement whatsoever in premise q, and the overall conclusion of p v q will still be true. It can be denoted as follows:
p / p v q (“From the premise p, we can conclude p v q.”)
Now, let non-p stand for the negation of p. In this case, it would stand for the statement “Socrates is not wise.” If non-p is true (“Socrates is actually not wise”), then p v q remains true only if the premise q is true. This is denoted as follows:
non-p
p v q / q (“From the premises non-p and p v q, it can be concluded that q must be true.”)
Following the traditional rules of inference, p and non-p cannot both be true at the same time (“Socrates cannot both be wise and unwise”). This is how the statement p v q can retain its meaningfulness. However, if contradictions were to be welcomed and accepted, then p and non-p can both be true at once, and the rule p v q can now be used to express absolutely anything: q can then stand for 2+2=5, just as it can stand for 2+2≠5, and it would all be true.
Since accepting contradictions entails that every inference can be equally true, it means that nothing can be falsified, and thus it actually provides no real information on the true state of things. It therefore must lead to the death of science.
The popularity of the dialectic lies in its apparent ability to explain most historical instances of the development of thought. It argues that all instances of historical progress happen in the typical way of the dialectical triad, and it is this vagueness that allows for every interpretation to fit. To Popper, this is the same as saying that things progress in stages—it is not saying much, and this paucity of information prevents any real attempts at falsification.
2. Hegelian Dialectic
The second section of this chapter traces the history of European intellectual thought, which has led to Hegel’s formation of the dialectical theory. For much of modern history, there has been a clash between continental Cartesian rationalism and British empiricism on the question of how knowledge is acquired. Whereas Cartesians believed that anyone who can reason can derive information regardless of their experiences, empiricists argued that pure reasoning is not sound and only experience can help people establish factual truth.
In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant established that human knowledge is limited to the field of possible experience, and any reasoning beyond this has no meaning. Although Kant’s argument is a form of empiricism, it did not convince German idealist philosophers to reject metaphysics; they instead chose to interpret his conclusion as a compromise between the two opposing schools of thought. Hegel was one of them.
In Critique, Kant attempts to answer the question of how science is possible and how the human mind can come to understand nature. His conclusion is that people can understand the world because the world is mind-like. The human mind digests information fed to it by its senses, and it impresses on information its own laws. The world as it appears to people is already a world digested by the mind, and thus it is mind-like.
Kant’s answer has elements of both realism and idealism. It is realistic because it asserts that the world has a material form, which can be grasped because it transmits information to the senses. It is idealistic because, despite having a material shape, its interpretation is ultimately done by the human mind—in other words, the world is forged by people’s minds.
Hegel was similarly interested in the question of how science was possible, but he pushed the idealist theory to an extreme. He argued that the world is ultimately a creation of the mind. Thus, anything that appears reasonable to the human mind is real, and anything that is real must be reasonable.
The weakness of Hegel’s theory is that it constructs a world based on pure reason. People can conceive of the world without consulting their senses or empirical data, since reality is always the same as their interpretation of it. This is an untenable position that Kant has already disproven: Any theoretical system can be constructed from pure reason, but so can its antithesis (see Chapter 7, Subsection 3). Thus, pure reason must contradict itself, and truth cannot be established without some empirical data.
Hegel bypasses this problem by embracing contradictions. He argues that what appears as a contradiction at first is in fact but a step toward the final stage of resolving the conflict. After all, the acquisition of knowledge is a process that is not static—since people have new understandings of the world, and their understanding is the world, then the world must be changing accordingly. Contradictions are not a problem, but are instead a necessary part of the dialectical triad: They must be present to lead to the transcendent synthesis.
Popper considers this evasion successful, but its problem is that it is too successful. It allows for the dialectic to be applied universally to every possible situation and encourages its defenders to argue dogmatically. Dialecticians, for example, will claim that any phenomenon disproving a dialectic is not actually contradicting it, but is instead a misinterpretation or the result of a lack of sufficient information. To Popper, this is an untenable and indefensible position. Saying that “Humans can grasp the world because the world is mind-like” is no more sensible than saying that “the English language can describe the world because the world is intrinsically British” (330).
3. Dialectic After Hegel
Although Hegel’s dialectic was idealist, his successors imparted a materialistic outlook to it. They argued that reality has a physical character, and since it is the same as the mind, then the mind must be a physical phenomenon as well. From this came the development of Marxism, whose purpose in defending materialism was to reject the rational or spiritual nature of man. This, in turn, would strengthen the theory that the development of ideas cannot be understood without grasping the situation in which they were created, especially in relation to the economic and material forces of the time.
Popper argues that Marxism contains two major problems. The first is that it emphasizes the possibility of using sociology to predict the future (Popper calls this practice “historicism”). In Capital’s Preface, Marx states that the primary purpose of sociological science is to use the dialectical triad to show how history has progressed and to prophesize the end goal of human advancement. Popper argues that while sciences do make predictions, they are conditional and can be falsified. By contrast, any erroneous prediction that the dialectical method makes is brushed away by stating that the method itself is still sound, and it is merely a lack of new information or an unforeseen circumstance that has not been accounted for that threw it off. Thus, despite Marx’s predictions about the transition from a capitalist to a socialist society being false, its defenders still hold that it is simply a difference in the interpretation of its timeline and manifestation.
The second problem with Marxism is that, despite Marx’s anti-dogmatic attitude, his defenders have never applied this in their own practice—they have never accepted any criticism of Marxism. It is reinforced dogmatism because, despite arguing that human knowledge evolves and reality with it, Marxism itself must never be superseded. Popper concludes by reiterating that, without freedom of thought and the acceptance of criticism, science cannot progress—and this is precisely why post-Hegelian Marxism and the theory of the dialectic have remained stagnant.
Part 2, Chapter 16 Summary: “Prediction and Prophecy in the Social Sciences”
Chapter 16 criticizes “historicism,” a doctrine that believes it is the task of social sciences to predict the future of human development and that this is needed to conduct politics rationally. It puts forward the idea that social progress can be foretold in a scientific way if the facts are interpreted properly. Popper believes historicism to be an ancient superstition, even though it purports to be progressive, scientific, and revolutionary.
There are three assumptions that give rise to historicism. The first is that human development can be as readily and precisely predicted as solar eclipses, if the right scientific method is applied. Since people have been able to predict solar eclipses with a great degree of accuracy, the same should be possible in the social sciences. The second assumption is that it is the task of the social sciences to imitate the natural sciences in this regard—their goal should be to predict the social and political developments of the future. Popper calls this the “historicist doctrine of the social sciences.” The final assumption is that policies must be determined based on these predictions to bring about the necessary change. This is dubbed the “historicist doctrine of politics.”
The problem with historicism is that it fails to distinguish between scientific prediction and unconditional historical prophecies. The former are conditional and accurate only within specific parameters—for example, in chemistry, water boils at a specific temperature at a specific altitude, while in economics a shortage of commodities and controlled prices encourage the development of a black market. These conditions can often be isolated, and the theory’s predictive accuracy can be ascertained over time because these phenomena are recurrent. Historical prophecies are not borne out of these conditional predictions because the course of human history cannot be described as isolated, stationary, and recurrent. In short, history, biology, and evolution are not stagnant and repetitive, and thus the social sciences cannot prophesize the future.
The first half of the chapter uses Marxism (also called “scientific socialism”) as an example of a doctrine that has fallen into the trap of historicism. The doctrine is attractive because it paints itself as scientific, progressive, and capable of using the methods of prediction found in the natural sciences to predict the course of human development. Popper remarks that, on this last point, Marxist logic approximates the Prophets of the Old Testament rather than the scientists of modern physics.
Popper then questions what the use of the social sciences is. Some believe its purpose is to study the behavior of social entities, such as ethnic groups, classes, and nations. Popper argues that this is mistaken, because these entities are not empirical objects, but defined by people—they are theoretical assumptions. Similarly, it is wrong to assume everything that has happened in society is an intended consequence of an individual or group’s design. For example, a man who wishes to buy a house will generally not want to raise the market prices of that district—however, his very act of being on the market as a buyer will tend to increase the prices.
Popper argues that social sciences should instead be concerned with analyzing the unintended consequences of intentional human actions. This way, sociologists can make ordinary predictions in a similar vein to the natural sciences. However, the goal is not to sketch a blueprint for a perfect society, but to guide people on what cannot be done. Just as the Second Law of Thermodynamics dictates that “You cannot build a machine which is 100 per cent efficient,” social sciences could put forth the rule that “You cannot, without increasing productivity, raise the real income of the working population” (343).
Although Popper believes Marxism to be completely discredited, he concedes that it raises important questions about how best to create a social condition fit for everyone. The author does not have a direct answer to this question, but he does caution that the use of revolutionary tactics often generates more suffering than good. Revolutions seek to destroy all existing institutions and traditional frameworks. In doing so, they destabilize the civilization tied to those traditions and force people through the slow process of recreating meaning, with no guarantee that the changes are for the better. Without tradition, Popper argues, people lose their basic reference point and can easily lose their way during the process of bringing about change, thereby causing revolutions to derail before they reach maturity.
In sum, institutions exist to uphold existing traditions. If they must be changed to fit a new social paradigm, it is better to do so through incremental modifications rather than via a tabula rasa method. This is why Popper believes democracy to be the superior form of governance, even though democracy is far from perfect; institutions that require bloodshed to dethrone do not welcome change at all.
Part 2, Chapter 17 Summary: “Public Opinion and Liberal Principles”
This chapter summarizes Popper’s contribution to an international conference of liberals, in which he challenged popular assumptions about liberalism. It is separated into the 8 subcategories listed below. His central argument is that public opinion might not always reflect the truth, and that freedom of thought is essential to the advancement of science.
1. The Myth of Public Opinion
Popper does not believe that public opinion, and the opinion of the majority, are always more correct than decisions made by the governing body. While it may be true at times that people on the ground have a better understanding of the situation than the government and that they often have better intentions, this does not mean that the vox populi (public opinion) is always more correct.
The foundation of liberalism lies on the basic belief that truth is manifest, which can be summarized as follows: “Nobody, if presented with the truth, can fail to recognize it” (348). It is an idea inherited from the Enlightenment and makes it difficult or impossible for people to be wrong—thus is born the idea of the popular voice being the most reasonable and correct. Popper calls this “the theory of rationalist optimism.” However, this belief is but a myth, as public opinion is more likely to sway on the side of rectifying a perceived injustice rather than factual truth.
2. The Dangers of Public Opinion
Since public opinion is anonymous, it is an irresponsible form of power. Therefore, even though liberals tend to favor limiting the power of the state, this should not be done without due consideration. Individuals can be pressured by public opinion, and in those instances, they require the protection of a strong governing body.
3. Liberal Principles: A Group of Theses
One popular liberal belief is that the state is a necessary evil and thus should be as small as possible. To challenge this, Popper points out instances where a strong state can help resolve conflict and establish a sense of justice. Even in a world where every individual is kind, there will be groups that are weaker or more vulnerable than the rest. These people should not have to live off the kindness of others, but instead require legal measures to protect them.
In order for the state to maintain justice, it must be stronger than any single individual or public corporation. Although democratic states are not a perfect system, they differ from tyrannies in that they can be changed without bloodshed. However, democracies in and of themselves do not confer any benefits upon their people, as it is the people themselves who must make use of the democratic framework.
Popper concludes that democracy is the least-evil form of government people know. Liberal utopias are but myths, because the first part advocates for individual rights, which cannot be established in a tradition-less society. Equity can only be ensured if institutions, such as the legal system, can act as impartial judges. These institutions must, in their turn, be tethered by certain traditions, without which they would fall into the trap of constant change, losing their core value and their purpose of existence. Thus, whenever change is necessary, it is preferable for liberal societies to promote the reform and change of existing institutions, rather than encourage a tabula rasa reset. This is why liberal societies have, as their greatest strength, their moral framework, which dictates a traditional sense of fairness and moral sensitivity.
4. The Liberty Theory of Free Discussion
Popper argues that truth is actually not manifest, and people can only approach it with imagination, trial and error, and by challenging existing prejudiced beliefs through critical discussion. This is a western tradition inherited from the Greeks, who promoted the critical rational method and valued criticism as a means to grow even wiser.
Rational decision between two parties is readily possible, if they both keep an open mind and are arguing in good faith. It should be made a public affair, as it promotes listening to alternative point of views, encourages a common sense of justice, and tolerance. Although a public opinion can result from these discussions, they are in and of themselves not to be confused with public opinion.
5. The Forms of Public Opinion
Popper points out that public opinion can either be institutionalized or non-institutionalized. The former includes institutions meant to influence public opinion, such as the press, political parties, universities, broadcasting companies, television, etc. The latter designates opinion formed by individual parties.
6. Some Practical Problems: Censorship and Monopolies of Publicity
In this section, Popper lists a few problems that liberal societies must contend with, for the purpose of enticing discussions during the conference. One example of a question, related to the above point, is how far publishing monopolies should be challenged by free thinkers and whether their ideas should be allowed to be published on their platforms.
7. A Short List of Political Illustrations
In this section, Popper lists a few specific cases that liberal societies might encounter and which should be carefully analyzed, with the purpose of facilitating discussions during the conference. One example includes the discussion of the morals of unconditional surrender in warfare.
8. Summary
Popper argues that while popular opinion might at times reveal the shrewdness of the government, it is nevertheless a danger to freedom if it is not kept in check by a strong liberal tradition. It should not dictate government actions and it is unacceptable as a measure for what is true and false. Although it can be used as an arbiter of justice, it can be easily influenced and thus must always be considered critically.
Part 2, Chapter 18 Summary: “Utopia and Violence”
In this chapter, Popper discusses why he is skeptical of utopias and why he believes the world can be free of violence. He expresses a deep hatred for the use of oppression and believes that rationality can help people reduce their urge to use violence, thereby bringing it under control.
He breaks it down thus: Disagreements happen because two parties either have differing opinions, interests, or both. However, when larger topics such as social organization come into play, it is often required to reach a decision of some kind. This can be done either by use of force—by silencing those who resist—or through compromise and discussion.
Reasonableness is the act of entering into a decision in good faith and using proper argumentation to reach a compromise. Reasonableness encourages open-mindedness and critique. It requires intellectual humility and the ability to listen and weigh both sides of an argument. In comparison, the use of force, such as through persuasive propaganda, does not allow for dissenting voices.
When every party adopts an attitude of reasonableness, the necessity to use violence to achieve certain goals is greatly reduced. However, Popper concedes it is very difficult to achieve this—any discussion requires both parties to be reasonable and discuss in good faith, and humans are not always wholly rational beings. Since people do rely on their emotions to make decisions, Popper does not believe reasonableness should be the primary goal for humanity to reach, but that it should remain present in people’s minds, so that they may fall back upon it at any point.
Popper warns in the second half of this chapter that rationalism should be practiced with care, as utopianism can result from it. The type of rationalism that he promotes—which believes in an objective truth that can be glimpsed with criticism and discussion—is a form that discourages violence. The other type of rationalism, which believes that truth can only be revealed and manifested by a select few, leads to dogmatism, intolerance of dissenting voices, and oppression. Popper argues that it is not only undesirable, but intellectually self-defeating.
This second type of rationalism is born when a group of people, believing their ideas to be rational, determine the final ends of a political change they intend to bring about. They believe their ideas to be scientific, when in fact there is no scientific way to determine two ends—even on topics such as the desirability of violence, there will be people defending both extremes. If people are willing to debate and change their minds, then it will suffice to convince them. However, arguments do not work against people who do not wish to change their minds—which is why there is no scientific way to construct a utopian world that would satisfy everyone. This is why any utopian project must be accompanied with violence, such as through the use of oppression, violence against dissenting voices, and propaganda.
Popper therefore concludes that utopianism, though it originates from a form of rationalism, is in fact self-defeating, as it will lead to a tyrannical government and less freedom of expression.
Going forward, to avoid the creation of oppressive regimes, Popper encourages people not to focus on the realization of abstract goods but upon the reduction or elimination of concrete evils. He also argues that a rational public policy should not be concerned with maximizing happiness—as everyone has a different definition for what that means—but the elimination of immediate suffering, which most people would agree takes on specific forms. In other words, rather than sacrifice the current generation for some dream of eternal happiness in the future, he proposes that institutions should be established or reformed to tackle existing problems. Thus, the sane rationalist is one who cannot be easily misled by distant promises, but is actively and humbly engaged in intellectual discourse in the present.
Part 2, Chapter 19 Summary: “The History of Our Time: An Optimist’s View”
This chapter summarizes Popper’s lecture by the same title. It asks what humanity has achieved so far in its sociopolitical, intellectual, and moral growth, and analyzes this question with an emphasis on the history of western society. It focuses in particular on the “Atlantic Community” of England, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and the Scandinavian countries from 1914 to the 1970s.
Though Popper considers himself an optimist in his reading of history, he warns that he does not possess the ability to predict the future, nor does he believe in humanity as inherently progressive. In fact, he believes, against other rationalists such as Bertrand Russell, that humans are not inherently becoming more immoral with additional knowledge: They are not more “wicked” as they become more “clever,” but rather are too good and stupid. Popper argues that many of the ails that still plague the modern world are the consequences of this mixture of human goodness and stupidity. This is because humans are too eager to better the world so they often fail to evaluate the rationality of their fervor. People are “easily led by the nose” (366), which is why even the most tyrannical of dictators has a large following.
Similarly, Popper points out that most wars are religious in nature—they have the purpose of realizing a specific vision for the future at the expense of others whose opinions differ. Tyrants misuse morality by professing that their utopic vision can only be achieved with sacrifices. They do not allow competing visions because theirs is the one that will bring about the most good, and it can only be achieved with dogged pursuit. Thus, too much goodness can be dangerous if it is not accompanied with rational criticism.
Popper uses the examples of communism and nationalism to illustrate this point. Both are ideologies that are “intellectually absurd” (367), yet have a following that will defend its morality religiously. On the one hand, communism, which professes to believe in human freedom, has created some of the most oppressive regimes. Nationalism, on the other hand, proclaims the natural right of humans to national self-determination, yet nation-states are nothing but human fabrications. In reality, there are very few cases of internally-cohesive ethnic groups who have historically lived in a fixed geographical area with natural borders. Popper argues that, since people who live under the same country often are not homogenous and since ethnic minorities exist everywhere, the aim should not be to liberate them by giving them a nation-state of their own, but to protect them within existing countries by creating specific institutions that defend their rights. Despite the failure of communism and the irrationality of creating nation-states, people continue to defend these theories for the ideal world they paint—this is why Popper theorizes that humans are generally good but stupid.
Nevertheless, the author remains an optimist and believes that the free world as it stands is the best society ever created, at least to the extent of existing historical knowledge. Popper believes it a fact that at no other period in time have people enjoyed a world in which their rights and dignity are so respected. For example, hospitals are increasingly working to reduce human suffering and providing care at low costs; poverty is greatly reduced and hunger has been eradicated; penal cruelty and enslavement are abolished; religious and racial discrimination are heavily frowned upon; war has been eliminated; social mobility has increased; and there are greater educational opportunities for all.
In fact, Popper proclaims that the free world has progressed to a point where wars of aggression have become a moral impossibility. Great Britain hesitated to resist Hitler and the United States allowed Soviet Russia to gain the intelligence to create hydrogen bombs—although they could have started wars over these matters, they chose not to do so. Almost every alternative is better than wars of aggression, partly because people have grown morally and have become suspicious of self-righteousness and self-praise. They have not only become more tolerant of differences, but also tend to more critically assess their own greatness in comparison with others.
Popper believes this illustrates the depth of human goodness, but he also cautions that people have taken it to the other radical extreme: That this habit of self-deprecation has become so stereotypical that people are tempted to advocate for their opponents. They attempt to find greatness in Stalinist Russia while downplaying the accomplishments of the free world. Since people are easily misled, Popper firmly believes that moral and religious ideas are as important to the functioning of a humane society as material wealth.
Rationalism is about evaluating ideas logically, and it is necessary in a world where truth is very hard to come by. Critical evaluation and testing are especially important because rationalism itself can lead to dictatorships. Critical assessment marks the difference between two competing branches of rationalism: Individualistic rationalism, and authoritarian traditionalism. The former believes that everyone possesses the ability to discern the truth, while the latter argues that a higher authority is necessary to guide the group. Only individualistic rationalism leads to the reduction of tyrannical governances; the current epoch has seen a rise of this type of liberalism which has led to a “fatherless” society.
Three factors have led to this modern liberalism. The first is people’s respect for the existence of an objective truth, which people seek without having to defer to an authority. The second is people’s disdain for religious wars, from which they have learned that it is futile to impose ideas on people who resist it. The attempt “to force men to conform” is pointless because those who resist the most are “the only ones whose assent was worth having” (375). The third is that frank discussions and criticism are the most effective tools that help people get nearer to the truth.
Going forth, Popper proposes that people embrace critical rationalism, wherein an objective truth exists and is upheld by a free society that values mutual respect. Rationalists must learn to appreciate tradition for its contribution to knowledge and remain humble, so that they are not under the certain impression that they hold the ultimate truth. This will help them remain open to criticism and to provide a better environment for discussions made in good faith.
Part 2, Chapter 20 Summary: “Humanism and Reason”
In this final chapter, Popper critiques the Central European neo-humanist movement of Italian philosopher Ernesto Grassi and German biologist Thure von Uexküll. These two scholars wrote The Origin and the Limits of the Moral and the Natural Sciences, in which they argued that philosophy can cure human depravity if it has the tools for understanding the essential nature of humanity. In other words, they claim that the humanities are superior to the sciences in guiding human action, and that science should only be considered the tool to help people achieve this goal.
The Origin and the Limits of the Moral and the Natural Sciences is divided into two parts. The first is written by Grassi and the second by Uexküll. Popper begins by commenting on the first half. He concedes that the way the sciences are being taught and conducted, especially the natural sciences, can be instrumental and dogmatic if they are only valued for their use as technologies. However, he disagrees that all science should be practiced in this way. Many great scientific discoveries were the result of the “great adventures of the human mind” (379).
The second part by Uexküll attempts to develop a new theory of science where biology is the key to explaining the behavior of organisms under specific conditions. It argues that people’s actions follow patterns (called “schemata”) and thus can be predicted if the schemata can be understood. By extrapolating this idea into a theory of knowledge, Uexküll concludes that reality, as perceived by humans, is a structure of actions, and knowledge is equivalent to participating (living) in this world based on learned patterns.
Popper praises Uexküll’s prose but points out that his conclusion is reminiscent of instrumentalism and disregards the possibility of objectivism. It paints knowledge as but a tool to help humans accomplish their goals, with reality existing only as every individual senses it. Popper instead proposes the idea that reality can exist objectively, and most importantly, that humans seek knowledge not only for its instrumental use, but to grow and transcend themselves. Some knowledge has immediate practical use, while other knowledge is allowed to exist even if it does not help humans accomplish an immediate goal.
Popper concludes that his version of humanism is one in which people are willing to seek an objective truth using creative means; where science is not dogmatic but welcomes criticism; and in which people seek to grow their minds not only to accomplish goals, but at times simply to transcend themselves.
Part 2, Chapters 15-20 Analysis
In this final section of Conjectures and Refutations, Popper defends the principles of liberalism while exploring The Role of Tradition and Creativity in Science. More specifically, he believes freedom of thought and social institutions based on specific values are crucial to the growth of science and human knowledge. This is because their counterparts—tyrannical governance and the complete uprooting of tradition—do not welcome criticism, thus destabilizing people’s relationship with knowledge.
Chapters 15 and 16 defend the necessity of having a strong tradition rooted in critical rationalism. These pillars are crucial because they uphold people’s understanding of the world and provide context for further scientific research. Even if some traditions are founded on erroneous premises, their existence remains meaningful insofar as they can become the premise for future attempts at falsification. By contrast, revolutionary ideologies, including Hegel’s dialectic and Marxism, tend to destroy existing pillars of knowledge and stagnate scientific growth by promoting relativism.
Popper points out that while Marx and Hegel themselves were flexible in their philosophies, their students and subsequent proponents have doggedly defended the two perspectives to the point where any serious attempts at refutation are rejected. Part of this is a consequence of the generalizability of the dialectic and of Marxism: Both ideologies evade falsification by being at once universal and too general, to the point where any event can be seen as an example of the dialectic or Marxist theory at play. Both also tend to promote the outdated practice of historicism, the misguided belief that the course of human history can be predicted in a scientific manner. Since both Marxism and Hegel’s dialectic evade falsification by promoting a relativist understanding of reality, they are fundamentally detrimental to scientific growth.
Chapters 17, 18, 19, and 20 all serve the purpose of defending the liberal principles of democracy and freedom of thought, emphasizing The Importance of Refutation and Criticism in upholding and promoting a free society. In these chapters, Popper argues that utopian societies promote violence and intolerance and are thus detrimental to the growth of knowledge. Tyrannies might be born out of a rational desire to create a better world, but they sacrifice individual thought and destroy any attempt at falsification because they rarely tolerate dissenting voices. By contrast, liberal societies have proven time and again that they offer the best environment for the furthering of scientific knowledge and social work, despite democracy being an imperfect mode of governance.
Popper optimistically believes in human goodness, but argues that, despite being good, people generally lack wisdom in making informed decisions. It is only in liberal democratic countries that they can engage in meaningful discussions, broaden their knowledge, and influence their government without the use of violence. As a result, this type of tolerant governance, which welcomes tradition but also the falsification of existing knowledge, is crucial to scientific growth.
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By Karl Popper
