Challenger: A True Story of Heroism and Disaster on the Edge of Space

Challenger: A True Story of Heroism and Disaster on the Edge of Space (2024) is a work of narrative nonfiction by Adam Higginbotham. It provides an in-depth examination of the cause of the explosion of the space shuttle Challenger on January 28, 1986. The explosion, which occurred a mere 72 seconds after liftoff, resulted in the deaths of all seven of the shuttle’s crew members and was made even more tragic because it was televised live, viewed by an estimated 95% of Americans. Higginbotham traces the factors resulting in the explosion to the inception of the space shuttle program in the late 1970s and examines the aftermath of the tragedy, which uncovered the cause of the explosion by a government-appointed committee. Higginbotham reveals how various political and economic factors led to mismanagement that resulted in the fatal decision to launch, despite known risks.

The book was awarded the Kirkus Prize for Nonfiction; was a finalist for the Carnegie Medal for Excellence in Nonfiction; was long-listed for the National Book Critics’ Circle award; and was named a Notable Book of the Year in 2024 by several publications, including The Washington Post, The New Yorker, and Smithsonian Magazine. Higginbotham is a British journalist who has made numerous contributions to American publications such as The New Yorker, Wired, and The New York Times. He is also the author of Midnight in Chernobyl (2019).

This guide refers to the 2024 edition published by Avid Reader Press of Simon & Schuster.

Content Warning: The source material and guide feature depictions of death and cursing.

Summary

The book opens by describing the 1967 Apollo 1 test flight. The mission was supposed to be the first moon landing, but the three crew members were killed when fire broke out inside the craft. Higginbotham explains the discovery of potential hazards in the lead-up to the practice exercise, as well as NASA’s attempts to remedy them. This tragedy foreshadowed the Challenger disaster nearly 20 years later.

The author then traces the inception and development of NASA’s space shuttle. The shuttle, unlike previous spacecraft, was designed to be reusable. Instead of shedding components as waste once their function was completed, each element of the shuttle was meant to be retrieved and refurbished and then used repeatedly for space travel. NASA envisioned the shuttle making frequent space travel an everyday norm, providing commercial uses. The potential commercial use differed from the purpose of the space program as an extension of the military, spying on its Soviet enemy for intelligence purposes. It also complied with the need to rein in NASA’s spending due to budget cuts.

As production of the shuttle got underway in mid-1970, NASA took steps to change its culture to address racial and gender inequality. Its 1976 search for applicants for the new space shuttle program was extended not just to civilians outside of the military but to women and racial minorities. Among the recruits who began training to become astronauts in 1978 were the first two African Americans in space, Guy Bluford and Ron McNair, and the first two women, Sally Ride and Judy Resnik. 

Meanwhile, the production of the shuttle was fraught with setbacks, namely the design of a heat shield that would insulate the craft from the heat created by the extreme friction caused during reentry to Earth. Engineers designed a series of 34,000 individual tiles—each unique in their size and thickness, according to their placement on the shuttle—but could not devise an effective way to adhere them to the shuttle. As the completion of the prototype was continually delayed, officials in Washington, DC, grew impatient and angered by the rising cost. NASA found itself under increasing pressure to complete the shuttle within an ever-shrinking budget.

In April of 1981, the first shuttle was finally ready for a two-day test flight into space. It would be propelled into launch by two solid rocket boosters—which caused a great deal of trepidation. The rockets, when ignited, acted essentially like enormous fireworks and could not be controlled. For many reasons, including the large amount of dangerous fuel they relied on, the first two minutes of the shuttle’s journey were the most dangerous of all. When the boosters fell away as planned, NASA cheered, as the space shuttle program was officially off and running. When the rocket boosters were recovered and examined, however, the engineers noticed slight wear to one of the O-rings—the rubber seal that kept the rocket joints closed and prevented fuel from leaking out. The damage was noted, but little was made of it.

From 1981 to 1985, NASA flew 24 successful missions of the shuttles Atlantis, Discovery, Columbia, and Challenger. Each time the rocket boosters were recovered and examined, however, the damage to the O-rings had grown increasingly worse. First thought to be an anomaly, by early 1985, it became cause for alarm by engineers at Morton Thiokol—the company contracted to build the rocket boosters. Engineer Roger Boisjoly became certain that a new solution was needed to seal the booster joints. The O-rings were showing increasing wear and damage that suggested that, in some cases, had the wear begun just seconds or fractions of seconds sooner, the crew of the shuttle could have been lost to an explosion. NASA listened to Thiokol’s concern but continually ruled that the performance of the O-rings was within the range of acceptable risk.

Meanwhile, NASA had announced plans to permit civilians to travel into space as passengers. They decided that the first participant would be a teacher and the second a journalist. With the support of President Reagan, NASA rolled out what was termed the “Teacher in Space” program, ultimately selecting two finalists from each of the 50 states and US territories. Christa McAuliffe, a high school teacher of history, English, and civics from New England, became an overnight celebrity when she was chosen. She, along with payload specialist Greg Jarvis, would begin training in mid-1985 for a January 1986 flight.

A January 1985 mission, however, foretold the disaster that was to come. The launch of the Discovery was delayed because of record-low temperatures in Florida. When the flight was eventually launched and the rocket boosters later recovered, Boisjoly flew to the cape to examine them there. He was shocked to find the worst damage ever to the O-rings and stunned that the fuel had not leaked completely. He theorized that the cold temperatures had made the O-rings less malleable, preventing them from shifting into place in time as they were intended to. Boisjoly, upon returning to Thiokol, set about proving this hypothesis in earnest, even voicing his concerns in an official memo. He was largely dismissed by his peers as an alarmist.

In 1986, the Challenger flight—which would be the first time in space for pilot Mike Smith—was pushed back due to delays in the flight ahead of it. It was scheduled for Sunday, January 26. Dick Scobee would be the captain, and the crew would include astronauts Ron McNair, Judy Resnik, and Ellison Onizuka, as well as civilians McAuliffe and Jarvis. When weather reports indicated the potential for cold weather on Sunday, the decision was made on Saturday to delay the launch by one day. Family members of the astronauts had traveled to Cape Canaveral to watch the launch—along with numerous politicians and other dignitaries—but they made plans to wait things out until a Monday morning launch. 

When Sunday dawned warm and sunny, NASA looked foolish, as the cold spell had not yet arrived and it would have been the perfect day to launch after all. Monday then brought one problem after another, delaying the launch further and further. A bolt on the hatch door became stuck, and what should have been a simple, minor task ended up taking hours to correct. NASA canceled the Monday launch, once again facing public humiliation and scrutiny. The astronauts were anxious to depart, but all were skeptical about the likelihood of a Tuesday launch since the cold snap was finally setting in. Record-low temperatures were now expected.

When news of the planned Tuesday morning launch reached Thiokol, Boisjoly was alarmed. He and his team dropped everything to gather data to present a recommendation to NASA as to whether to launch on Tuesday. On Monday, there was a flurry of communication between the various branches of NASA. At around eight o’clock on Monday night, NASA held a conference call with several Thiokol managerial personnel and engineers. Boisjoly and his team presented their warnings against a cold-weather launch: The fragile O-rings were not designed to be used in temperatures as cold as predicted and would not be able to warm up fast enough in time for a morning launch. Thiokol advised not to launch on Tuesday morning, but this was not the answer NASA hoped to hear. They pressed Thiokol, stressing the lack of sound data. Thiokol asked for a recess so that they could discuss the matter privately. When the conference was resumed, Thiokol had reversed its decision and recommended that NASA go ahead with the morning launch as scheduled.

The overnight temperatures reached a low of 24˚ Fahrenheit. Since water was left running to prevent pipes from freezing, the launch pad and the space shuttle were covered in thick layers of ice by morning. NASA set about de-icing, though the astronauts were certain that they would once again be delayed. They were surprised when they were transported to the launch pad. When the air temperature climbed above freezing at 34˚, the launch was given its final go for 11:38 am. Televised live, countless Americans, along with all of NASA and the astronauts’ families, watched as the rocket boosters were lit and the shuttle launched into the sky. However, 74 seconds later, the entire shuttle was engulfed by a cloud of smoke. No one knew what was happening. Nearly a minute later, commentator Steve Nesbit finally stated that a “major malfunction” seemed to have happened. The Challenger had exploded.

In the immediate aftermath, NASA was careful to collect and secure all data and refused to speculate publicly about what the cause of the explosion might have been. President Reagan gave a statement on the tragedy in place of the scheduled State of the Union address. The Reagan administration swiftly set about organizing a commission to investigate the cause of the Challenger disaster. Chaired by former Attorney General William Rogers, the 12-person Rogers Commission consisted of current and former astronauts and military pilots, as well as Nobel Prize-winning physicist Richard Feynman. 

NASA executives testified during televised sessions but downplayed the role of the weather and did not reveal the known problems with the O-rings. Meanwhile, recovery efforts were underway to collect all remaining pieces and debris from the Challenger so that the precise cause of the explosion could be discovered. When Boisjoly and fellow engineer Allan McDonald witnessed the explosion, they immediately knew that what they had predicted—the failure of the O-rings to operate in cold temperatures—had happened.

The Rogers Commission finally uncovered the mismanagement present in NASA’s rush to launch after details about Thiokol’s warnings about the O-rings were leaked. Several of its employees testified in closed sessions, revealing the pressure that NASA had placed on them to reverse their “don’t launch” recommendation. In April, the solid rocket booster where the problem began was finally recovered—definitive proof of the cause of the explosion and the death of the seven crew members on board (whose remains were recovered from the ocean floor). The hearings were long and grueling, and the Commission finally gave its findings and final recommendations in June of 1986.

NASA went on to revise the process by which its shuttles were deemed ready to launch. However, in 2003, disaster struck again when all seven crew members of the Columbia were killed upon the shuttle’s reentry. A piece of foam that had split away during launch had damaged the heat shield. NASA ended the shuttle program in 2011.