A Theory of Justice

Rawls states that “the moral conception adopted is independent of natural contingencies and accidental social circumstances” (451). Therefore, moral sense conforms to fair principles, and when acting from such principles, persons act autonomously: “[T]hey are acting from principles that they would acknowledge under conditions that best express their nature as free and equal rational beings” (452). The principles of moral psychology are agencies persons utilize to reach a complete understanding, but a person’s conception of right is ultimately set independently for themselves.

Under the contract view and in the original position, autonomy and objectivity are compatible. Justice as fairness does not dictate that the conscientious judgments of a person always be respected or that persons may form whatever moral convictions they desire. Actions based on conscious directives may violate the principles: “[A] person’s conscience is misguided when he seeks to impose on us conditions that violate the principles to which we would each consent in [the original] situation” (455). In this situation, the offending person’s conscience is not literally respected, but the person is respected by the limiting of the offender’s actions when necessary, as the mutually acknowledged principles permit.

When there is social doubt and a loss of faith in long-established values, there is a tendency to rely on the virtues of integrity, rather than the principles of justice.